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In Chapter I, the approach taken to the study of records is
introduced. Sociologists and historians treat recoi'ds as only
contingently true. However, they do not explicate the source of
the contingency. They do not address the basic idea of records which
makes the contingency possible. The notion that records are only
*
contingently true stems from a conception of fact as a relation
between record and event which parallels a conception of language as a
relation of words to things. The event is supposed to produce the
record but the record (and recorder) are not supposed to produce the
event. Various practical problems with records stem from the need
to produce this asymmetric record-event relationship.
In Chapter II, an investigation is begun of how the record-event
relationship is achieved. It is achieved by the action of "observation".
Observation requires an observer's presence but it also requires that
the observer's presence not make a difference to the event. If the
observer's presence does not make a difference, his record can be
analytically identical with the event and therefore the event can be
known through the record. The observer's presence is supposed to rid
speech of its opinionated character. By being present, the observer
need not speak in an opinionated way. He can be a "witness" to the
world which speaks for itself. .ua present witness, what the observer
can know is time-bound and place-bound. He can know only the "present"
time and the "present" place. Records are the kind of Speech
observers produce about the present, speech which does not afftct things
but merely "notes" things. Given that observers can know only the
present, records become necessary in order to grant permanence to an
observer's kind of knowledge.
In Chapter III, the observer-recorder's concept of the present is
further investigated. The present in the sense that it can be known
is not a moment in time; it is an appearing, self-disclosing thing.
Recording, then, presupposes a particular definition of things: things
are appearances. Because the event is thought to present itself, the
observer need not contribute to it. To say that the observer can see
only the present is not to limit the observer to the "physical". It
is to limit the observer to anything which can present itself. Finally,
it is suggested that the notion that observers can see only one thing
at a time can be accounted for in terms of the grounds of observation.
The observer sees just one thing at a time since his notion of a thing
is analytically identical to his notion of a time.
In Chapters IV and V, an attempt is made to apply the analysis of
the grounds of records to problems involved in the use of records by
hospital bureaucrats. Bureaucrats seeking to use i-ecords face a
problem in that they were not present when the records were made (and
the event happened) and therefore would seemingly have nothing that is
not opinionated speech to say about the record. The bureaucrat's
solutions to the problem involve putting his own speech at the service
of the record just as the observer puts his speech at the service of the
event.
The first specific solution is discussed in Chapter IV: bureaucrats
can subjugate their speech and know events indirectly by "relying" on
observers, thereby achieving analytic identity with observers.
Concern with reliability on the part of bureaucrats (and sociological
methodologists) is explained in terms of the basic grounds of
observation. It is shown in some detail that bureaucrats do in fact
attempt to ensure that "reliable" records are produced.
In Chapter V, the topic is shifted from reliability to complete¬
ness. Hospital administrators are concerned with the completeness
of records rather than their accuracy. However, the concern with
completeness i: not an example of goal displacement since, through
the concern with com.leteness, bureaucrats manage to control their
own speech, thus attaining the self-same lack of participation that
observers attain. By evaluating records in terms of completeness,
bureaucrats turn the record into an appearing thing, thus attaining
a kind of presence with it.
In the conclusion, two implications of our study for further
work are developed. 1. Empirical analysis must be seen not simply as
a method for finding'; out whether theories are correct since the very
idea of beint empirical precludes even asking some ii portant theoretical
questions. 2. Just as record-writing can be thought of as an idea
which requires grounds, the speech of social theorists can be thought
of as reouirin. t method. A brief attempt is made to p roduce" the
speech of Goffman and Garfinkel.
iv
ACKHUamUGi&ENTS
This work is just one product of ideas that have been nurtured
in me by a relationship that began about ten years ago with two
teachers I first met at Columbia University, Peter KcHugh and Alan
Blum. Vhat is reported here is an attempt to apply to the topic
at hand, records, my more or less current understanding of a
sociological method which has been evolving as our relationship
evolved. Peter PcHugh, particularly, has been closely involved in
the long process that led to the dissertation. Ply efforts to look
at records in terms of their "idea" began with a devastating but
(typically) totally honest critique he made of my first attempt to
write about this topic. Since then, he has continually managed to
push a sometimes reluctant student toward a deeper understanding of
what he was really talking about. This work owes more to him that I
can ever adequately say.
The great extent of my debt to Alan Blum will be apparent to
anyone familiar with his extraordinary book, Theorizing. His influence
was decisive in the approach to the problem of speech which has been
taken in Chapters IV, V, and VI. I have also benefited greatly from
/
listening to and watching the unpublished Blum. I despair of ever
being, able to repay both him and McHugh for the very many hours they
have devoted to my education.
Although I have been thinking about records for quite a few
years, the approach actually taken in the thesis was conceived the
year I started lecturing at Edinburgh University. Since then, Gian
Poggi has been my principal supervisor. He has made extremely
perceptive comments on my work, applying an unerring critical eye to
two previous drafts of the thesis. I must also thank him for taking
V
on a student when others were unwilling to do so.
Elaine Samuel has been my unofficial supervisor for years.
She has helped me to develop many of the ideas reported here. In
addition, she has edited at least three drafts of the thesis with
understanding, great intelligence, and even affection. I hope I
prove to be as helpful to her in her work as she has been to me in
mine.
The hospital data I use was collected while I was a project
supervisor on a medical research project headed by Elliot Preidson,
with the assistance of Derek Phillips. I would like to thank them
for their support.
TABLii OP CONTENTS
PiiHT I - THE GROUNDS OP THE ACTIVITY OF RECORDING
I Introduction ..... I
II Observation and Records 21
III Records and Events 50
PART II - IMPLICATIONS OP THE GROUNDS OF RECORDS FOR







THE GROUNDS OP THE ACTIVITY OF RECORDING
 
1.
The work reported here is an attempt to formulate the nature of
records and to consider the implications of their nature for the use
of records in a large, modern hospital. edical records are the
specific subject of this study. The hospital studied is typical of
modern hospitals in having an abundance of medical records. There are
daily notes by doctors and nurses concerning the health of all patients,
past and present. These make up the bulk of what hospital personnel
call the "medical record." In addition, there are a plethora of
records recording most of the important events in a patient's hospital
career. Long notes reporting on admission ana discharge are entered
into the "record" by doctors. When the patient is admitted, he is
supposed to have an extensive physical, which is duly described for the
record as are any operations the patient may have. Pathologists,
social workers, and psychiatrists enter reports of examinations. If
a patient dies, that too will be described in detail for the record.
If discharged patients are seen in out-patient clinics, reports on
these examinations ere entered as well. In this study, when we refer
to records, it is these medical records which furnish most of our
concrete examples. Hov.ever, as the most distinctive feature of this
work is not the subject matter but the way we have decided to approach
it, it is necessary to say how we intend to analyze records. The
discussion is meant to apply to records in general rather than
specifically to medical records.
Instead of beginning with a definition of records, we shall
begin with a discussion of what has been said to justify records for
sociological use. As we shall try to explain, these justifications
turn primarily upon an unstated notion of fact as a relation between
record and event, which parallels the idea of language as a relation
of words to things. Our concept of what records are will emerge
only after we have considered the idea of a record which is implicit
in historical and sociological discussions of records.
Sociologists and historians use records as data which permit them
to infer "what has happened." Records are, of course, the historian1s
major source of data. Collingwood describes history as follows:
History proceeds by the interpretation of evidence:
where evidence is a collective name for things which
singly are called documents and a document is a thing
existing here and now, of such a kind that the historian,
by thinking about it, can get answers to the questions
he asks about past events.1
Kitson-Clark writes that "... Documents in official archives are
necessarily one of the main ... sources of information for the
2
historian." Gottschalk writes:
... The history of historians is two things: (a) a
process of examining records and survivals, and,
(b) a way of "writing up" or otherwise presenting
the results of that examination.5
Records are used by historians to get "as close to what actually
happened as we can ... from a critical examination of the best
4
available sources."
An interesting point is being asserted but not explicated in
these quotations: the facts are not the records themselves, but
that which the records report, which is to say there is an implicit
suggestion here of some unexplicated relation between the record and
the event reported by the record. Collingwood, for example, by
asking us to "think about" records in order to learn about events is
1. Collingwood, R.G., The Idea of History Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1946, pages 9-10.
2. Kitson-Clark, G., The Critical Historian London: Heinemann,
1967, page 76.
J. Gottschalk, Louis, Kluckholm, Clyde, and Angell, Robert, The
Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and Sociology
Bulletin No. 53» New fork: Social Science Research Council,
1945» Page 8.
4. Ibid., page 35*
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proposing a relation between record, and event. However, as an
explication of the relation, "think about" is, of course, too vague.
In t inking about records one is apparently somehow able to move
from thinking about the record to thinking about what the record is
about". Although the record is in one sense a thing to be thought
about it is also a special kind of thing, a thing which can be related
to other things so as to be "about" them. Gottschalk, by proposing
that records can get us "close to what actually happened" is proposing
some such record-event relationship. The record is not what happened
but can (somehow) get us near to what happened. We shall not
object to Gottschalk's or Collingwood•s proposals but we shall
explicate the record-event relationship which they assert.
Although sociologists are less likely than historians to make
use of records, many sociological studies, both classic and modern,
have made extensive use of them. The original sources of Durkheim's
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statistical data in Suicide were presumably written records. In
The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, Thomas and Znaniecki used
various types of records, including but by no means only "first
person" accounts. They also used court records, the records of legal
aid societies, coroners' records, and the case records of a charitable
organization.^ in the famous Hawthorne studies, iioethlisberger and
Dickso relied on written records for some of their data. They
offered this account of the usefulness of ". aily historical records":
5. Durkheim, Emile, Suicide, London: Routledge and Kegan-Paul,
1952.
6. Thomas, ftilliam and Znaniecki, Florian, The Polisn Peasant in
.Europe and America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2 vols., 1918.
This (the record) was designed to give a complete
account of the daily happenings in the test rooms
what changes were introduced, the remarks made by
operators ... the daily problems with which the
investigators were concerned, and all other
observations that might be of value in interpreting
the output curve ... This record was invaluable in
reconstructing the history of the testroom.f
Like historians, then, sociologists are using records in order to
determine "what happened", and like historians they are therefore
relying on a relationship between record and event without explicating
it.
Among the many kinds of records used in more modern studies have
been Navy records in an investigation of the causes of airplane
8 9
accidents, plant records in an investigation of worker morale,
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medical records in a study of imaginary insect bites,"1' and court
records in an analysis of delinouency rates in the U.S.S.R.^"''
While noting that records are but one of the many possible data
sources for sociologists, methodologists often recommend that records
be used in sociological research. Riley suggests that certain types
7. Roethlisberger, T.J., and Dickson, William, management and the
, orker, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, page 27.
8. Lodge, G.P., "Pilot Stature in Relation to Cockpit Size: A
Hidden Factor in Navy Jet Air Craft Accidents", American
Psychologist, 1963> 17» page 468.
9. Hjman, H., and Katz, Daniel, "Morale in War Industries", in
Newoomb,T., and Hartley, E., editors, Readings in Social Psychology,
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947» pages 437-447*
10. Kerckhoff, Alan, Back, Curt and Miller, Norman, "Socio-! etric
Patterns In Hysterical Contagion", in Sociometry, 28, no. 1,
March 1965» pages 2-16.
11. Connor, Walter D., "Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S.S.R.: Some
'quantitative and qualitative Indicators", in the American
Sociological Review. April, 1970, 35» n0* 2, pages 283-297*
For summaries of studies which have used written records see
Y.ebb, Eugene, Campbell, Donald, et al. Unobtrusive f.'easures,
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966, pages 53-111*
5-
of records make available facts which cannot be obtained by most
research methods?
... Medical, psychoanalytic, or social-work case
records ... may serve as "expert" records of
complex human relationships and processes,
affording insights not open to the lay investigator
who himself attempts to gather such technical
material.
Moreover:
... Available data can be used as the basis for
research on interaction - and on the very type of
continuing private interaction that is usually
inaccessible to direct observation.^
Selltiz also notes some of the advantages researchers can gain by
using records.
(Records) ... have a number of advantages in social
research, in addition to that of economy. A major
one is tha fact that much information is collected
periodically, thus making possible the establishment
of trends over time. Another is that the gathering
of information from such sources does not require the
cooperation of the individuals about whom the information
is being sought, as does the use of Questionnaires,
interviews, projective techniques and, frequently,
observation. ^-5
Although Riley and Selltiz are more interested in discussing
the advantages involved in the use of particular kinds of records
than in outlining general features of all records, more issues
concerning the record-event relationship are implicit in what they
say. Riley's second point assumes that a record (at least from the
viewpoint of the researcher to whom it is "available") is not direct
observation. She is pointing to (but not explicating) a feature
of records, namely, that in looking at a record one is indirectly
12. Riley, Matilda White, Sociological Research, I, A Case Approach,
New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, page 243.
13. Selltiz, Claire, et al.. Research Methods and Social Relations,
London: Methuen and Company, 1965» page 316.
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looking at some other thing, in this case private interaction. But
how does a record make such interaction accessible? Why is the
record best seen not as a thing which is itself accessible but as a
thing which makes other things accessible? Selltiz tells us that
periodic collection makes it possible to establish a trend over
time. Presumably the existence of more than one record (through
periodic collection) is not the trend over time which Selltiz has
in mind. In some unexplicated way, what is important about the
recorded information is not that it is itself in time (even though
it is periodically collected) but that it can tell us about other
things which may form trends over time. The record, in that it
permits us to "establish" things, is somehow outside time (eternal?)
and yet it can tell us about other things (events?) which are in
time.
Selltiz also notes that gathering information from records does
not require the cooperation of the record's subjects. The absence
of the need for cooperation amounts to another implicit statement
concerning the record-event relationship. Cooperation is not required
in that the record-event relationship is not between one speaker and
another (who would have to cooperate) but between a speech (record)
and what the speech is supposed to reveal (the event). The record
has somehow made the subjects of the record, even if they are persons,
into things which reveal themselves to readers of the record,
whether the subjects like it or not. Heading records may not require
co-operation but surely reading records and writing records involve
some kinds of operations whose rules of procedure deserve to be
specified. Selltiz and Riley do not try to explicate the charac¬
teristics of records or describe how they are produced and read.
Other writers have focused on the disadvantages of records but we
7.
shall find that they are no closer than Riley and Selltiz to a
consideration of the issues we wish to discuss.
Disadvantages involved in the use of records are as common a
theme in the literature as advantages. Many writers have warned
of the danger of "bias" in records. In his discussion of documents,
Cicourel writes:
Historical and contemporary non-scientific
materials contain built-in biases and the
researcher generally has no access to the
setting in which they were produced; the
meanings intended by the producer of a
document and the cultural circumstances
surrounding its assembly are not always
subject to manipulation ana control.14
and Douglas warns:
... the official statistics on suicide are probably
biased in a number of ways ... such that the
various sociological theories of suicide will
be unreliably supported by these official
statistics. ^
Sjoberg and Nett alert us to sources of bias in the records of
16 17
government officials and newsmen.
Bias, of course, is not just the simple matter of outright
dishonesty. As most writers on the topic see it, there are also
more subtle dangers inherent in the use of records than the
possibility that the records are blatantly dishonest. Even rela¬
tively honest records may present only a one-sided view of the events
they purport to describe. Cochran has warned of the danger of
14. Cicourel, Aaron V., Method and Measurement in Sociology:
Glencoe: The Free Press, 19M» page 143.
15. Douglas, Jack, The Social Meanings of Suicide, Princeton:'
Princeton University Press, 1967» page 191•
16. Sjoberg, Gideon and Nett, Roger, A Methodology for Social
Research, New York: Harper and Row, 1968, page I65.
17. Ibid, page 164.
subscribing to records which present a sentimental version of reality
By taking the written record that was easiest to
use and most stirring from a sentimental or
romantic stand-point, that is, the record of the
Federal Government, the American historian prepared
the way for one of the major misconceptions in
American (history) ... the primary roles of the ^
central government in our historical development.
Goode suggests why lower class persons may be underrepresented in
written records, thus leading to imcomplete pictures of the past:
... So high a percentage of past populations were
made up of people with odd histories. A high
percentage were illiterate and in any event not
important enough to figure in written records, or
in the conversations of people who did write diaries,
letters, and books.^
Furthermore, if one depends upon records for one's knowledge, there
will be certain periods about which one cannot know anything at all:
A fortiori, the past of generations long dead, most of
whom left no records or whose records, if they exist,
have never been disturbed by the historians touch, is
beyond recall in its entirety.20
When literacy is low, not only do fewer people record
their private or public thoughts, and create fewer
documents ... but all documents are socially less
important in such a period, and thus less likely to
survive. 2-*-
Although there are obvious differences between discussing
advantages ana discussing disadvantages of records, both kinds of
discussion do have at least one thing in common. In both cases,
the record-event link is being assumed rather than explicated.
That the many methodological difficulties just mentioned have to be
18. Cochran, Thomas, et al., The Social Sciences in istorical Study
New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954» pages 160-161.
19. Goode, William, "The T.heory and Measurement of Family Change",
in Eleanor Sheldon and Y-.ilbert Moore, eds., Inaicators of Social
Change, New York: Russell Sage, 1968, page 312.
20. Gottschalk, et al., op. cit., page 8.
21. Goode, op.cit., page 314•
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dealt with at all suggests that there is a contingent relation
between any record and what the record is meant to do, namely reveal
facts. Perhaps this point seems obvious, but it is odd that the
standard in accordance with which the relation comes to be contingent
remains both unexamined and unformulated. From Goode's, Gottschalk's,
and Cochran's accounts, for example, we may gather the following:
events may or may not have records; events without records cannot
be known; some records of events fail to be good records. Again
we have the assertion of a relationship between record and event and
we have this relationship as a contingency. Still missing is an
explication of what exactly the relationship is, how it has come
about, and why it is a contingent relationship. Thus Goode relies on
the fact that records must "survive" but does not tell us why they
must. What, to take just one of many possible questions we could
address to his account, is the difference between event and record
such that events do not have to survive and records do? Is the
record a substitute for the event, the survival of the record somehow
insuring the survival of the event? Perhaps this formulation is
correct but if so we have additional interesting issues to address.
What kind of thing can adeouately substitute for another thing given
that some t; ings (including some records) can be poor substitutes?
What features of events make substitution necessary and what features
of records make substitution possible? Furthermore, if some records
can fail to be good substitutes, by what standard do we differentiate
good from bad substitutes?
Although the two main problems with records noted by methodologists
seem to be observer bias and the absence or incompleteness of records,
other problems are also mentioned. Cicourel has suggested that the
researcher may not be able to understand the records from other periods
or cultures. Webb and. many others have described how the presence
23
of a record-writer may influence the event to be recorded;
Phillips worries that record writers may be "too remote from the
24
event", and Ladge that the erratic qualities of our sense organs
may lead even relatively unbiased observers to perceive and attend
badly.25
One way to inspect the opinions of sociologists and historians
about records is to distinguish between those who think records
provide relatively good data and those who think records provide
relatively bad data. At one extreme, Garfinkel can argue that records
are almost always bad data:
Any investigator who has attempted a study with
the use of clinic records, almost wherever such
records are found, has his litany of troubles
to recite. moreover, hospital and clinic
administrators frequently are as knowledgeable and
concerned about these "shortcomings" as are the
investigators themselves.^6
At the other extreme, Shera can state that:
The official public records of highly civilized
countries probably more nearly approach perfect
evidence than any other form of documentation.
In between are many methodologically inclined sociologists and
historians who have discussed the_jlangers inherent in the use of
^
22. Cicourel, op. cit., pages 154-6 for a summary of his views.
23* Webb, op. cit., Passim.
24. Phillips, Bernard, Social research; strategy and tactics,
Sew York: the Kacmillan Company, 1971» page 148.
25. Siadge, John, The tools of Social Science. Longmans, London,
1953» pages 120-122.
26. Garfinkel, Harold, Studies in Kthnomethodology, Hnglewood Cliff,
Sew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 196?» page 191*
27. Shera, Jessie Houwk, Historians Books and Libraries, Cleveland:
The Press of Western Reserve Unive sity, 1953» page 17*
records and, also, methods for reducing the dangers. A general
theme of most discussions is that there are both advantages and dis¬
advantages in the use of records as data. Whichever side is taken,
however, the important point for us is the existence of an implicit
standard to which we must refer in order to decide whether a given
record or all records are factual. In other words, both sides are
relying on something without explicitly talking about it. They are
relying on conceptions of what makes the record good, of what makes
the record factual. Therefore, we shall be discussing the logically
prior issue, namely the possibility of making the claim that records
are factual, whether or not that claim is rejected in any given
empirical case.
The analysis will consist of an explication of the grounds or
underlying ideas which make it conceivable that records could reveal
facts. If the anelysis is adequate, the grounds described will
form the foundation both of arguments that records are factual and
of arguments that records are not factual, in the same way that the
grounds for seeing a killing as premeditated murder will be found in
the arguments of both prosecution and defence attorneys. The very
impulse to investigate the grounds of the claim that records are
factual suggests that we conceive of the claim as problematic, a
matter which those we have discussed themselves propose in their
writing about records. The claim is problematic not because it is
either true or untrue, but because, as we see it, the claim represents
certain unstated ideas about records, facts, and events which are
important for understanding the nature of social science, record¬
keeping, claims for truth, rejection of such claims, and other related
Researchers who use records in their studies and methodologists
who discuss problems inherent in records share a basic commitment
to conceiving of records as sources of data, however inadequate,
which permit inferences, albeit not certainty, about the real world.
In this study, our interest is in investigating the grounds for using
records as data and the implications of those grounds for the use of
records within the context of a hospital. In terms of this interest
most methodological discussions concerning records are inadequate
because they beg our question: they presuppose the grounds which make
it possible that records could be facts and investigate, instead,
whether given records are facts. We would prefer to examine how
the possibility of records as factual - non-factual is established.
For example, Gottschalk offers rules for deciding whether records are
truthful. He writes:
(l) Because reliability is, in general, inversely
proportional to the time-lapse between event and
recollection, the closer the document is to the event
it narrates the better it is likely to be for
historical purposes. (2) Because documents differ
in purpose ... the more serious the author's intention
to make a mere record, the more dependable his docu¬
ment as a historical source ... (3) Because the
testimony of a schooled or experienced observer and
reporter ... is generally superior to that of the
untrained and casual observer and reporter, the
greater the expertness of the author in the matter
he is reporting, the more reliable his report.
Gottschalk also notes that "official histories must be treated with
29
caution" and that "... there are laws and conventions which oblige
30
witnesses to depart from strict veracity."
Gottschalk sees these rules as principles to be followed by
competent researchers. For us, the very existence of these rules
generates questions. Why is reliability always a trouble in research
28. Gottschalk, op. cit., page 16.
29. Ibid., page 22.
30. Ibid., page 41*
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based on records? What is the connection between records and
32 33
recollection? What is the connection between records and events?
Why does the character of observers always become an issue in research
34
using records? What is the relationship of records to the ideal
of "veracity"?55
More basically, what is the nature of records such that Gottschalk
and others must formulate rules about their use, and what are records
such that these particular rules might seem reasonable? In other
words, we neither accept nor reject Gottschalk's rules. Instead,
we want to understand the grounds which make these rules seem
/ \
necessary and reasonable. Reliability, for example, is associated
with time for Gottschalk. What socially enforced idea of time does
Gottschalk conceal ("time-lapse" is cryptic to say the least) which
makes it possible to be "close" in time and which enables this kind
of tempox-al access to be more adequate for truth than distance? We
need a rendering of the standard normative order of social science
which methodically selects and distinguishes truth-producing scientific
recording, apparently on the basis of presence and absence.
In rule 2 above, Gottschalk asks that the authors seriously
intend to make a record. The notion of seriousness here creates
more problems than it solves. We can, for example, treat with
suspicion any author who seriously intends to make a record, there
being all sorts of bureaucratic and political records felt to be
untrustworthy for this very reason. Think of the difference in this
case between "he intended to make the record" in Gottschalk's sense,
whatever that is, and "he deliberately set out to make that record."
51. See especially Chapter IV below.
32. See Chapter II.
33« See Chapter III.
34. See Chapters II and IV.
35« See Chapters II and V.
What do we presuppose of the serious author who intends to make a
record, then, distinguished from the one who deliberately makes the
one he does; and why is the one who is not serious less likely to
produce a truthful record, given that Gottschalk probably wants us
to be disinterested rather than politicized and the casual recorder
might be the most disinterested of all?
Continuing on to the schooled observer, as distinct from the
casual reporter, we might ask what Gottschalk expects from the former.
Perhaps he is expert, in the sense that the historian could read the
document with the understanding that it had been written with his
historian's standards in mind, that it was written by someone of whom
it could be said that he knew what he was doing - he is history's
representative insofar as the historian/reader can ignore temporal
distance through a surrogate presence.
Gottschalk admits that these rules are not hard-and-fast. Others
•zC
can argue, for example, that official histories make the best records,
37
or that nearness to the event can lead to bias. Therefore we can
also aski what is the nature of records such that Gottschalk's rules
need not apply, such that closeness to an event can sometimes be a
hindrance and official histories can be the most informative records?
And, more basically, is there a rule or principle which would make
necessary both Gottschalk's rules and the exceptions to them? We
suspect that there is and, furthermore, that Gottschalk is relying on
it in making his definite assertions about records.
All the features of records which have been listed in passing so
far: that they can make good data, that they can be biased, that it
36. Shera, op. cit., page 17•
37. Palton, Melville, "preconceptions and Methods in Men Who Manage"
in Hammond, Phillip, editor, Sociologists At Work, New York:
Basic Books, 1964> page 74*
matters if they are missing, that it matters who has written them,
that they make possible inferences but not certainty about the real
world, are phenomena which we will subject to analysis. To treat
these features as phenomena is to neither accept nor reject them.
We will not deny that records can make good data or that they can
be biased. Instead, we will attempt to provide the grounds which
account for all of these features of records. We have already
noticed, along with Gottschalk, that records can be adequate or not.
Gottschalk is interested in poor records as poor history, of course,
in that inadequate records become a feature of inadequate historians,
that inadequate recorders become features of inadecuate records that
become features of inadequate historians - i.e., the collector is a
feature of that which he collects. So Gottschalk must provide
(tacitly) for differentiating his collecting from the problematic status
which he concedes attends any historico-sociological research even
when that research follows his rules. Gottschalk can formulate his
own history as an instance of good history through some (unexamined)
characterization of the record as requiring presence and disinterest.
The observer, he tells us, must have a particular relation to time
(presence) and must produce in himself a particular orientation
(disinterest). But Gottschalk never questions the reason for
collecting in the first place. If he did he might be able to
formulate the idea which generates both the adequate and the inadequate
and thus could be relieved of the stipulation that his rules are
themselves inadequate to a defence of the adequate record. We
shall try to find the general rules that provide for both GottschaIk's
rules and the exceptions to them.
Given our commitment, we will not be able to stop with methodo-
logists' descriptions of the features of records. Even the work of
ethnomethodologists seems inadequate to us because it, too, pre¬
supposes the grounds of the activity of recording. Bluin and KcHugh's
description of ethnomethodology makes the relevant point in another
contexti
Ethnomethodology seeks to "rigorously describe"
ordinary usage, and despite its significant —
transformation of standards for conceiving of and
describing such usage, it still conducts its
enquiries under the auspices of a concrete,
positivistic conception of adequacy. Ethno-
methodology conceives of such descriptions
of usage as analytic "solutions" to their
tasks, whereas our interest is in the production
of the idea which makes any conception of relevant
usage itself possible.3®
In our case, the topic or the idea under consideration is records.
Although Garfinkel has described some "troubles" associated with the
use of records and some "good organizational reasons" for these
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troubles, he has not explicated the basic idea of records which
makes these troubles with records possible. Garfinkel reports
"troubles" for potential users of I'ecords, for example, missing
information, ambiguous information, irrelevant information. However,
like Gottschalk, Garfinkel leaves almost everything still to be
explicated. Is it really so obvious how even a good record could
"inform" us? What are prople saying when they read a record and say
that they "learned something?" Obviously, "learning something" or
even "getting information" from a record is a different matter from
"learning something" from a novel, but exactly what is the difference?
Garfinkel mentions that good record-writers should "get the story
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right." But what is it about record-writers and records that
38. Blum, Alan, and licHugh, Peter, "The Social Ascription of
Motives" American Sociological Review, 36, February 1971»
footnote, pages 98-99*
39* Garfinkel, op. cit., pages 186-207.
40. Ibid., page 195*
makes it even possible that they can be "right" or "wrong", unlike,
for example, novelists who are evaluated by totally different
standards? Furthermore, the easy answers to these questions are
themselves questionable. If records can be "right" or "wrong" by
corresponding to the world or not, how is that possible? How can
one thing (a record) correspond to another thing (a world)?
Record-writing must depend on some kind of interesting segregating
procedure by which two things, a record and the "world" are first,
differentiated from each other and, then, related to each other so as
to make the one, ideally, "about" the other. But how can one thing
be about another? Again, we are back to the idea that records are
a special kind of thing i.e., words, but surely the word-thing
relationship exemplified in records needs to be formulated in more
detail than just saying it is "troublesome". After all, even novels
are "about things" in some sense, so again, what is the difference
between a record and a novel? The obvious answer, that records
are about the real world whereas novels are hbout other kinds of things,
would not get us too far. If we did try this route toward an answer,
surely we would have to provide an adequate formulation of this
"real world" which records are differentiated from and then related
to in such a way as to produce an "about" or "correspondence"
relationship.
There is another problem with Garfinkel's formulation of record¬
keeping besides the fact that it leaves so many interesting issues
unexplicated. Perhaps because he does not see anything worth talking
about in the "obvious" features of records we are going to examine,
in order to have news, Garfinkel is forced to exaggerate. In the
quotation which we reported earlier, Garfinkel stated that all investi¬
gators find records inadequate. Obviously, though, some persons do
not have trouble with records. For Garfinkel these cases are so
uninteresting that he chooses to ignore them. However, in terms
of the questions we raised about records, those who succeed in using
records are as interesting as anyone else. In succeeding they must
have solved all the problems we have already raised. For example,
they must have somehow been able to see one thing (a record) as both
different from and corresponding to another thing, (the orld). More
generally, they must have used some normative order to decide that a
given record or all records are "good".
In a way, Garfinkel is like Gottschalk in that his description
does not cover all the cases. The troublesome character of records is
a possibility but not a necessity. Therefore, to describe records
as troublesome, as Garfinkel does, is not to make much progress
towards a formulation of the nature of the idea of records. Again,
if Garfinkel would address and attempt to formulate the basic con¬
ception which allows records to be seen as fact, he might be able to
provide both f or those who find records troublesome and for those who
do not. Both groups presumably have in common some implicit and
unexplicated notion of what constitutes a good record. It is this
underlying idea that we shall try to get at.
In the whole discussion so far, the fact that there is only a
contingent relationship between record and event makeB reference to
the exigency that what a record records (i.e. the "original" material,
the event) is, strictly speaking, unknowable, and so the adequacy of
any record is problematic. Certainty is impossible, the only sure
thing being that the record exists. vv'e know definitely that there
is a record but not whether it is adequate or not. Y.hat conception
orients us to this version of records and thus also provides for the
rules of thumb and practical problems we have reviewed?
Although formulating in detail the underlying conception of a
record is the major task ahead of us, we can offer some preliminary
remarks now. The best record is one that is a photo-copy of the
event. The record is not supposed to be an independent thing but
merely a reflection (copy) of another thing. The record repeats
the event but is not supposed to be, in any important sense, itself
an event. To understand how a record could be a copy, we must
understand how "factf (rather than fantasy, humour, etc.) can be seen
in the document - how the record can be a possible copy of that which
is external to it. Seeing fact-in-a-document requires distinguishing
between document and event as a matter of boundaries, limits, the
outside (what the record reports) and the inside (the record, the
word.) The record and its events stand in a relation of asymmetric
externality and independence:
(1) The events are not seen as produced by the record, but the
record is seen as produced by the events.
(2) The events can occur and remain unrecorded, but the record
cannot occur without the events.
In social science an event which goes unrecorded is thought to be
real but not to be communal property. The event needs to become
socialized - it needs a name, and until it becomes socialized, it has
no status as a fact. Having been socialized, it is made accessible
as a possible topic. The relation of events to records is a relation
of exterior, constraining things to words, which generates the possibility
of attention by the social scientist according to his conception of
socialized fact. This is why social fact is at the deepest level
socialized fact.
By the same token, these relations establish matters of evidence
as well as topic. If there is no event corresponding to a record,
the record has no author(ity); it lacks status as a namer of anything.
The rules of thumb on training and observing which we have reviewed
address how we may see fact in a document as a matter of preserving
this relation of asymmetric direction between event and word.
Gottschalk's description of the recorder amounts to a description of
the way the record should be made. That the recorder should be dis¬
interested can now be seen to mean that he should be interested only
in that it happened. That is, the record should be a product, not of
his interest but of the event. Gottschalk's "serious" author intending
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to make a "mere" record must be an author who is willing to let the
event make the record. That the record is merely a record means that
the record (or recorder) has not produced tne event. A "mere" record,
then, is one that has been produced by nothing but the event it purports
to record. The observer's presence in time when the event happens,
his "closeness" to the event must be a device for insuring that the
event will produce a record, i.e. that someone will be able to let his
speech amount to nothing but a product of the event, thereby supplying
science with a fact to which it can attend.
The way a record is prepared and organized provides for our
conception of a photo-copy by detaching the thing (event) from the
word (record) in such a wa^ as to make the link of asymmetric direction
transparent. The various problems with records (the potential
absence of an event corresponding to the record, the failure of an
observer to be present, the overinvolvement of a recorder in his
record, etc.) stem from a v rsion of fact as contingent upon the
segregation of thing: and word. uur problem will be to explicate the
rationality of the idea which makes the record possible, the idea that
the event but not the word should produce the record.
Chapter II
OBSERVATION AND RECORDS
In Chapter I we noted that words must be segregated from and then
made dependent on events if the idea of a record is to be made
intelligible. The notion of a record requires that the word can
be thought of, not as an event, but as "about" events. Chapter II
continues this examination of records by considering how it is
possible and why it is rational to bring about the word-thing
relationship exemplified in the record. We approach these topics
through a consideration of the action necessary to produce a record.
Medical records are produced by persons who are supposed to be
engaged in the activity which might be called observation."'' We
might feel inclined to say, then, that the factual status of records
is established by the fact that they are produced by observers.
Although our records are produced by observers, merely to stipulate
this point is to say nothing about the factual status of records
because whatever it is that would comprise the action of an adequate
observer remains to be specified. If one can produce a good record
by being a good observer, then our topics must become what it is to be
a good observer, and why, by being a good observer, one can produce
records.
What is the link between records and observation? The record must
be a particular kind of speech. It must not exist merely as itself
(as speech). It must exist as a reflection of its topic, i.e. as a
reflection of events. The ouestion is: how can one go about
producing this kind of speech? We shall note that one can produce
such speech by being an observer. In the literature the question of
what an observer is (and how, if at all, he can be said to be speaking)
is, like the question of what a record is, not really answered.
1. "Observation" is being used in a broad sense which we specify
at some length below.
Selltiz's description of observation can serve as an example:
We are all constantly observing - noticing
what is going on around us. We look out the
window in the morning to see whether the sun
is shining or whether it is raining, and make
our decision about carrying an umbrella
accordingly. If we are driving, we look
to see whether the traffic light is red or
green •.• There is no need to multiply
examples; as long as we are awake, we are
almost constantly engaged in observation.
It is our basic method of getting information
about the world around us.^
We agree with Selltiz that multiplying examples will not help, but
have the examples which she does give really helped either? Is not
her problem that all she can do is give examples? That this quo¬
tation does not permit us to understand what is distinctive to the
activity of observation can be seen if we try to consider the
proffered "definition". We are supposedly observing when we notice.
Would Selltiz want to say, then, that everything we notice is an
observation? If we notice that Selltiz has produced an inadequate
definition, is that an observation? Perhaps it is, but then should
we not wonder why Selltiz did not notice that herself? Do some of us,
then, observe (notice?) better than others? If so, is it only the
good observer who notices or are we to say instead that we all
notice different things? If we take this tack, what are we to do with
the Selltiz notion that what we notice is what is going on around us?
Are different things going on around all of us and do their differences
depend on us? Maybe Selltiz would want to distinguish what is going
on from what we only think is going on. Would she say that thinking
is not noticing? Ythat is the difference between noticing and
thinking you notice? Moving on to the window example, Selltiz
seems to want to distinguish looking and seeing. Y>hat is this
2. Selltiz, Clair et al., Research Methods in Social Relations,
London: Methuen and Co., 19^5, page 200.
distinction getting at? Sometimes, it seems, we can look without
seeing. Does noticing involve both of these activities or only
one? Are there other ways of seeing besides looking? If there are,
should we classify these as observation? With regard to Selltiz's
version of what we see when we look, "what is going on" and, later,
"the world around us" are singularly uninformative phrases. Exactly
what is going on around observers? One thing? Many things? What
kinds of things?
We ask all of these questions, not to immediately answer them,
but to suggest the need for a fresh investigation of what the action
of adequate observation might amount to. Our suggestion is that it
amounts to producing the kind of speech exemplified in the idea of a
record. Does this mean that Selltiz is wrong to identify observing
with noticing? Is observing a kind of speaking rather than a kind
of noticing? Or is the noticing Selltiz refers to perhaps her (vague)
way of referring to the kind of speech observers are supposed to make.
Maybe observers say something by putting into words what they have
noticed. On the other hand, one can presumably say something
without having noticed anything. V«e are back to the idea that
records are, and observers make, a particular kind of speech. Do
they make such speech by noticing what is going on? If so, we shall
have to try to describe what it is to notice and what it is that is
"going on".
-1-
At the heart of all of these issues is the question of what an
observer is. Let us begin with a discussion of what is meant by the
activity of observing. To be an observer is to be present, to "be
there". Being there can be conceived, albeit vaguely, as being in
the presence of whatever one is claiming to observe. If one is not
present, if one is not "there" in the present, then whatever one is
doing one is not observing. However, although the observer must be
concretely present, he is not supposed to make a difference. The
contact of observation must be direct and unidirectional in that the
contact flows from event to observer, so that the record can be
direct and unencumbered by the observer's opinions. The observer
must be disciplined and watch over any impulse to participate and thus
contaminate the unidirectional flow. The reader of any record can
believe he is reading a record if he can also believe the record is a
reproduction of such unidirectional contact.
Observing can be distinguished from activities as diverse as
theorizing, reminiscing, and expecting. For one thing, the latter do
not require one to be present with the object of one's theorizing,
reminiscing, or expecting. For another, these activities may
actually thwart observation:
Expectation or anticipation frequently leads a
witness astray. Those who count on revolutionaries
to be blood-thirsty and conservatives to be gentle¬
men ... usually find bloodthirsty revolutionaries
and gentlemanly conservatives.3
It is perhaps obvious that Gottschalk fails to come to grips with his
own version of observation here. Suppose, as Gottschalk recommends,
one does not anticipate. Does one then not find bloodthirsty
revolutionaries and how is this not itself a result of lack of
anticipation? How is the negative of anticipation different in
principle from anticipating and then finding what one has anticipated?
Apparently what Gottschalk thinks is important is that the observer
should not do something, in this case expect or anticipate. By not
3. Gottschalk, op. cit., page 42.
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doing these things one is somehow able to avoid being led astray. The
observer, although he must be present, is being asked to negate him¬
self in some interesting but unspecified ways. He is not to expect
or anticipate and somehow what he does not do is going to make him
into an adequate witness. Is there a positive version of what the
observer should do available to someone, if not to Gottschalk, or is
Gottschalk's emphasis on what observers should not do perhaps his
(vague) way of saying that the action of observation is essentially
negative, the action of observation requires not having an effect.
Observers must be there and yet they are not supposed to make their
presence felt.
Methodologists concerned with the problem of observation generally
presuppose the simple fact that observing requires presence, and
ignore the idea that while the observer must be present, so must he be
absent insofar as he is not to participate in that with which he is to
be present. The issue surfaces in the literature on participant
observation and the argument of whether it should be overt or covert.
That it should be covert suggests that the observer gets in the way of
the record by having' joined as a co-speaker what would otherwise be a
univocal event. That it may have to be overt suggests that observation
nevertheless must be a certain kind of presence, namely a presence
which organizes itself to be in a position when the event reveals
itself. Finally, that he must at least be covertly present and not
away at his home reaffirms that presence is essential. Dalton, for
example, never questions this requirement but stresses possible
effects:
(The observer's) presence may disturb the very .
situation he is seeking to freeze for study ...
Weick:
Observers are perceptable as well as perceptive.
They are usually present in any observational
situation. Vhether this presence alters the
course of a natural event is the concern of _
h
every person who uses observational methodology.
Note that we are given the same peculiar concern here. On the one
hand, we are to be physically present; on the other, we are not to
make a difference. We are to be present in t:e one sense, yet absent
in the other.
The link between presence and the ability to observe can be seen
in the plotting which novelists must go through in order to put their
narrators at the scene of an incident. Hawthorne, for example, puts
Roger Coverdale, the narrator of The Blithedale Romance, at a hotel
window, in a treehouse, and behind a tombstone in order that he can be
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present at scenes about which Hawthorne wants his reader informed.
In moving Coverdale into strange locations, Hawthorne is relying on
the two ideas that narrators cannot observe unless they are present
but also cannot be effective observers if their presence imposes itself
on the events.
Such machinations in order to maintain a presence which will not
make a difference are not limited to first person narrators. It is
a commonplace that social scientists engage in similar procedu¥e"S:
4. Nalton, op.cit., page 74« See also Geer, Blanche, "First
Days in the Field", in Hammond, op. cit., page 326.
5. Weick, Carl, Systematic Observational . ethods", in Lindzey,
Gardner .and Aronson, Elliot, Editors, The Handbook of Social
Psychology, Reading Mass: Aadison-¥esley, volume 2, 1968,
page 369.
6. Hawthorne, Nathaniel, The Blithedale Romance, complete works,
volume 5> London, Kegan-Paul, undated.
In attempts to disguise the fact that observation
is taking place, observers have hidden under beds
in college dormitories, eavesdropped on conversations
in theatre lobbies and along streets and posed as
radio interviewers.7
lost medical records depend for their adequacy on the implicit
claim of the record-writer to have "been there". If we could
imagine some reader challenging the following nurse's note by asking
how the nurse knows these facts, the emphatic answer would be that she
knows these facts because she observed them - because she was "there".
12sj50 a.m. patient has no special rate, no
respiration noted. Dr. Jones notified and
responded immediately. Patient pronounced
expired 12s45 a*m. Family visits. No
consent for post mortem obtained.
Noting the exact time of events, a common technique in medical records
whatever other functions it may have, certainly serves to support the
implicit claim that the nurse was "there". At the same time, the
nurse's having been there is not to be seen as the point of the record
If we read this note as a record, it is not the fact of the nurse's
speech, not the existence of the nurse, to which we are meant to
attend. The speech and the nurse are mere vehicles for the trans¬
mission of the real object of interests . the things she speaks "about"
The record is the event to the extent that we see the nurse's speech
as not making any difference. The nurse qua speaker should cease
to matter since her speech is supposed to amount to nothing but a re¬
presentation of other things (the patient's death, the doctor's
response, the post mortem, etc.) The thingness of her speech and
the thereness of the nurse cease to matter if she succeeds in denying
the fact of her speech by making her speech totally dependent on some¬
thing other than itself, in this case, the events.
7. Weick, op.cit., page 373• See also the book by Campbell
and Webb, op. cit.
In the following psychiatric record, both the use of quotations
and the reference to the author's (nurse's) involvement in the events
help to establish the writer's presence at the reported events:
... (The patient) approached Mr. Wagner and asked
if he wanted to be "smacked on the behind. One
shot will get you out. Why marry and ruin some
girl's life, anyway?" Reluctant to talk when
nurBe (the record-writer) tried to engage him in
conversation on his feelings.
Although the record-writer does, in a sense, enter this record, she
enters it not through her speech but as another object which her speech
can disclose. The writer becomes "the nurse", merely another thing
to be spoken about rather than the participant who made the speech.
Again speech has been subjugated by being made the servant of its
subject, the subject in this case happening to include the record-
writer.
This example helps to clarify how what sociologists refer to as
participant observation does not necessarily threaten the basic idea
of observation. The observer can participate as long as he is able
to treat his participation as merely another thing to be spoken about.
Like the nurse, then, the participant observer makes himself into one
of his topics but also like the nurse he still succeeds in observing
if he can treat his speech not as a fact in its own right but as
dependent on what it is about, i.e. its subject, which in this case
happens to include himself. More obviously, although both nurse and
participant observer can participate in the sense that they can be
part of the scene which they describe, neither is supposed to impose
himself on the event. Usually their participation is limited to
"drawing out" what is thought to be there already. Thus in the record
just quoted we are to focus on the patient's reluctance. That is the
"fact" the record brings to us rather than, e.g. the fact that the nurse
talked to the patient. Again we have the nursed presence not as
making a difference but merely as prod to help bring out what is really
there, in this case the patient's reluctance.
Just as record-writers can claim to know the facts because they
were present when they occurred, they can claim not to know the facts
because they were physically absent. There are, of course, parts of
the medical record which describe events which have occurred when the
record-writer was not there. For example, all charts must include a
"history" of the events leading up to the illness for which the patient
has been hospitalized. Obviously, doctors who take histories have
not been present at these events. When items of this sort are in¬
cluded in the record, record-writers will be careful to note that what
is reported is mere hearsay. They cannot certify the accuracy of the
information in the record precisely because they were not "present"
when the events happened. A description of a patient's "complaint"
reads, "Patient states that she took overdose of Seconal", reminding
the reader that only the patient's version of what happened is being
reported. In this case, the writer is clearly denying that she can
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know what happened, because she was not there. More precisely, when
recording "hearsay", record-writers are continuing to follow observers'
principles. The difference between "hearsay" and other events is
that in "hearsay" what the record-writer can know (as observer) is
not what happened but what the patient says has happened.——The event
8. In the following anecdote told by Whyte, Doc can be seen as
making the same point. He can know what happened because he was
present while V.hyte cannot know because he was absent: "(The) full
awareness of the nature of my study stimulated Doc to look for and
point out to me the sorts of observations that I was interested in.
Often when I picked him up at the flat where he lived with his
sister and brother-in-law he said to me 'Bill, you should have
been around last night. You would have been interested in this.'
And then he would go on to tell me what had happened." Whyte,
William, F., Street Corner Society, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1955» Pa£e 301.
with which the record-writer is present is the patient's speech.
This speech is treated in the same way any other event is treated,
that is, it is treated as a thing to be disclosed by treating one's
own speech as mere vehicle for the disclosure of what the record is
really "about", in this case the patient's speech. Although hearsay
is usually formulated as information at second remove, really it is
(as the word implies) information at first hand, but about what someone
has said. Of course, given an interest in the "original" event, the
problem represented by hearsay is that there have been twice as many
chances for the observer's rule to be violated, twice as many chances
for speakers to fail to control their speech so as to let the event
speak through them.
Since records are written by observers and observing depends upon
presence, record-writers leave gaps for the periods when they cannot
be with patientsj
Patient out on day-pass, due to return 11:00 p.m. Didn't.
4:00 p.m. has not returned. 7:00 p.m. still not back from
pass.
Patient went to the operating room and returns back to the
floor.
These writers are not being good reporters in that they are leaving out
crucial (yet according to the observer, only opinionated and not
knowledgeable) information such as what happened while the patients
were away from the hospital or in the operating room. They are, how¬
ever, being good observers by showing their ignorance about events
from which they are absent.
The connection of observing to presence suggests a very simple,
albeit partial, explanation for the abundance of records in complex
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organizations m modern society. It may not be sufficient to our
9. On the growth of record-keeping systems, see Wheeler, Stanton,
'^Problems and Issues in decord-Keeping", in Wheeler, editor,
On hecord. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, pages 10-11.
understanding of records to say that organizations require rational,
efficient, and objective observations and therefore require employees
to be present in order to make the observations.^ PerhapB organi¬
zations require employees to produce observations in order to
motivate employees to be present at events they would otherwise
avoid. Thus, there are two ways to account for the fact that all
hospital nurses must write one record every day for every patient.
The hospital needs daily records, but also the fact that they must
write a daily record forces nurses to see patients they might other-
11
wise miss.
We shall return here to the observer's dilemma with regard to his
concurrent presence and absence if he is to be able to record. The
observer is to be there but he is not to participate. He is to
speak but not to make the fact of his speech the point of his speech,
what are we to make of this peculiar and on the face of it contra¬
dictory set of actions and omissions? A record is made by one who is
present in time (the observer). Somehow the observer's presence
enables the record and, through the connection noted in Chapter I,
the event as well, to last or become eternal. The event becomes known
insofar as there is a record of it. How is the presence of a record
made to equal the presence of knowledge? If the event appears to a
present observer, it can become knowledge if the observer can deny that
the record is an achievement of his participation in the event. That
10. weber has made the classic statement of this position. See
: eber, I,Lax, From lax Weber, editor, Gerth, H.II. and Mills, C.W.,
London: Routledge and Kegan-Faul, 1948» page 197* "See also
Blau, Peter, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1963 > pages 36-55*
11. In other words, forcing nurses to be present is a "latent function"
of records. See Merton, R.K. Social Theory and Social Structure,
Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957, pages 6O-64.
is, an observer needs to be present but is not supposed to have parti¬
cipated in the creation of the event if the record is to be treated
as knowledge. Recorders, then, are observers of spectacle; they
are present but do not participate. In this sense they are an absent
presence. The achievement of the observer is the achievement of
absence through presence. The responsible observer is one who
can make what he observes responsible for what he records.
what is eternal about records, as in the notion of an archive, is
achieved by the process of divorcing the record from its maker. If
the record is devoid of any contamination arising from the observer's
participation, then record users can know the event through the
record because, since the record has not been affected by the observer,
it becomes unnecessary to understand the observer in order to understand
the record. The record speaks for itself. If an observer is present
then he can know about a present event. That the observer is no
longer present and that the event is a thing of the past can be
irrelevant since, through the record, the observer has become irrele¬
vant.
To observe, then, is to be a spectator. To be a spectator is to
show the capacity to record. The spectator, if he can be said to
participate at all, participates not as co-s1 eaker with the event, but
as passive observer of the thing which is the event, identical with
the things which are the words of the report. Through the segregation
of the observer from the record, the record is made to stand by itself.
Analytically speaking, the observer might as well not be there, and we
have formulated hoy, he is not there. In this analytic regard there
is no essential difference between the observer who presents himself
as such and the one who observes in secret, since the achievement of
the admitted observer is that he is not there at all, whatever the
actual circumstances in which he makes the record. Kaplan has
remarked that "observation means that special care is being takent
the root meaning of the word is not just to 'see', but to watch
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over." We are arguing that the observer must take special care to
avoid intruding on and hence affecting the event. "Watching over",
then, is not to watch over the event in the sense that one must
control its production, but merely to watch it given the negation of
participation by the self. What is "watched over" is the self, so
that the self can be said to be indifferent to the watched event in
order that appearances can show themselves as events. What "makes
the record" is the event and not the observer. taking a record is at
most noting the appearance. In this way the most important activity
of the observer is not to make the record but to make ready so that
the event can make the record - to be ready so that the event can
present itself. The observer makes ready by segregating his speech
(the record) from him-self (that he makes the record).
Presence, then, should be used by the observer as a method for
permitting the indifferent recording of spectacle. The observer's
indifference - the fact that he does not make a difference to the
event - is what makes the event eternal, always present, and not
subject to further transformation. The observer can adequately record
the appearance of things by watching over any impulse to join them.
What he watches over is the continued segregation of speech from
speaker which simultaneously neutralizes the speech and socializes
the event.
12. Kaplan, Abraham, The Conduct of Inquiry, San Krancisco: Chandler
publishing Company, 19^4 > page 127.
The permanent presence of the event through its record is achieved
by the obliteration of that which could make a difference to the event.
What could make a difference is a co-speaker. The co-speaker is
obliterated by having the event speak alone through the record. The
absence of a participant factualizes the event as a record and thus
makes the event eternal. The event is permanently present-if, through
the denial of the effects of his participation, the recorder has
managed to make a record which amounts to nothing but the original
event. The observer makes a record by making himself into nothing.
As the observer becomes irrelevant, the event becomes permanently
present.
-3-
Thus far v/e have described observing as an activity which achieves
absence through presence as its way of obtaining knowledge. bet us
now attempt to establish the possibility of this accepted link between
observing and knowledge. Our question is: how must knowledge be
conceived in order that the idea of presence could be a means of
obtaining that knowledge? We must attempt to formulate the con¬
ception of knowledge which makes the idea of an observer possible
and necessary as a means to obtain that knowledge.
The observer can be described as solving the problem of knowledge
by being there, by presence. The solution embodied in the observer
is just one possible solution to the problem of knowledge, however.
It is a solution which makes observing (presence) reasonable, but it
is only a solution to a particular and differentiated version of the
problem of knowledge.
Our question now is: for what version of the problem of knowledge
could presence, could the observers kind of being there, be a solution?
To answer this question is to characterize the particular conception
of the problem of know/ledge which is presupposed in the idea of
observing. When the problem of knowledge is constrained by a certain
conception of time and place, then the idea of an observer, of presence,
could be a solution to the problem of knowledge. Our task is to
explicate the conception of time and place which makes an observer
necessary.
TD£1?
By thinking of himself historically (as a being in time) man
makes the relationship between self and knowledge into a contingency.
Kan is not knowledge (since he is finite). Kan is he who can do
the knowing. The distinction between self and knowledge makes man's
ability to know into only a possibility, thus laying the basis for a
distinction between knowledge (what is known) and opinion (what man
only thinks he knows). Yve shall be concerned only with one particular
way of differentiating knowledge and opinion. The form of the dis¬
tinction with which we are concerned is achieved by detaching the self
from the world and treating the self's speech as only problematically
connected to the world which that speech is "about". The contingency
of knowledge resides here in various possible relations between
speaker and world. The practical question of knowing becomes: how
to assure the kind of relation that would produce knowledge rather than
opinion? Given the problematic status of the relationship between
speech and world, one answer to the problem is to treat speech as
true speech only if speech and world are "together" i.e., only if the
speech can be segregated from the man (the speaker) and given to the
15. Ye shall begin this section with a very brief review of ideas
which have given rise to the version of time corresponding to
the development of observation. It is certainly not our
intention to do this exhaustively, nor to consider alternatives.
world. By transfer, as it were, the world is made to speak for
itself, because it is made devoid of participation by the man who
would raise anew the very problem of knowledge which this particular
relation is meant to solve. In effect, the observer is generated by
making him speechless, a witness to a world which testif-iea for
itself.
■hat is known is thus what is witnessed as the world's speech.
What is known is the witness's transcription of the world's speech.
What is known is limited to the circumscribed and local coalescence of
the event and observer. With regard to time, local coalescence is
achieved through co-presence of world and witness. Time is itself
conceived to both enable and inhibit a relation of local co-presence
which determines that which can be known and that which cannot. The
future cannot be known and the past cannot be known but the present can
be, and thus the problem of knowledge is reasserted as the twin barriers
of past and future. Given the problem of knowledge, an observer con¬
stituted by presence solves the problem in this domain by, again,
localizing the relation between self and world (here, that part of the
world that passes by). The fact of his presence shows that he
recognizes his version of the problem of knowledge i.e., his presence
suggests that he recognizes that neither the future nor the past can
be known but the present can.
ttiley states that:
The method (observation) is applicable to action taking
place only in the present. It obviously cannot be
used to refer to periods prior to the inception of
the research.^4
14* Riley, op.cit., page 187.
However, to state that observing is "inapplicable" to past and future
fails to preserve the action of observers as they achieve their
relation to the present. It is not that observing is "inapplicable"
to the past and future but that the idea of observing (presence)
expresses the basic conception that neither the past nor the future can
be known and only the present can be. An observer's whole reason
for existence depends upon the idea that only the present can be
known.
If observing is grounded in the idea that only the present can be
known, record-writers, insofar as they are acting as observers, should
express ignorance about both the past and the future. Thus v.riters
who refer to the future tend to be uncertain about it as if what they
write is only an opinion and thus defeasible!
He is to be discharged in A.M. if all goes well.
If he remains relatively calm through the weekend he will go
home free.
'waiting for results of lung scan.
Even when the future is a medical certainty, record-writers qua
observers will express doubt. Even when their "medical" opinion is
that patients will certainly die, record-writers will write thati
Patient looks moribund and is bleeding uncontrollably from
two puncture sites.
Prognosis extremely poor.
Condition is very poor.
Insofar as they are acting as observers, medical record-writers will
also be uncertain about the pasts
Had possible seizure after which was found in bed with
burning mattress. question of smoking in bed. (My emphasis)
The nurse can be certain about the event she observes (the...burning
mattress), but she can only guess about what may have occurred
earlier (a seizure, smoking in bed)."'"^
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It must be stressed that we are grounding the role of observer
and not making factual statements about the past, the present, the
future. Obviously, it would be absurd to suggest that the past
can never be known since historians, archeologists, geologists
and others are gaining knowledge about the past all the time.
Similarly, to argue that the future cannot be known would rule out both
the scientific activity of predicting and the common sense activity
of expecting. It is also absurd to state definitely that the
present can be known, since, about many current events, we will be
clearer tomorrow than we are today. Ve are not suggesting how past,
present, and future must universally be seen; we are suggesting how
observers must see the past, the present, and the future for their
activity i.e., presence, to make sense. Ours is a formulation of a
formulation necessary to make the activity of observation intelligible.
Thus, we are not saying that the past cannot be known. We are saying
that insofar as one believes that the past can be known one thereby
eliminates the necessity for observing that past when it was present.
%hen a historian can write that:
The intellectual fascination which underlies the form
of history is the aesire to understand the meaning
of what has happened in former times.^
he is defining himself as other than an observer precisely by treating
15. There is an awkwardness in the formulation here due to the fact
that the analysis is incomplete. As will be explained in Section
4 of this chapter, the observer can, in a sense, know the past.
lie can know the past if he was present when it was the present.
16. To say that we are "grounding" the role of the observer is to
say that we are using the method described in Chapter I: we are
explicating the underlying ideas which make the observer possible.
17. Buizinga, Johan, "A Definition of the Concept of History", in
Klibansky, Raymond, and Paton, II.K., editors, Philosophy and
history, Essays presented to Ernst Cassirer, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1936, page
the past as knowable without his having been there. Insofar as
archeologists, geologists, or psychiatrists can treat the present as
permitting inferences about the past, they can make it unnecessary
that they be present in the past in order to know it i.e., they can make
it unnecessary that they be observers of that past when it was present.
Similarly, insofar as one can claim to know the future, whether
by prediction, prophecy, or expectation, one eliminates the need to
observe that future when it becomes present; one is eliminating the
need to "wait and see". Waiting and seeing i.e., observing, is only
18
necessary when the future can be treated as unknowable.
Finally, the notion that the present can be known is not a general
principle; it is an observer's principle. If one treats the present
as unknowable as, for example, skeptical philosophers do, one can
19
thereby make it seem unreasonable to observe the present.
Place
Just as observing is grounded in a particular conception of time,
it is also grounded in a particular conception of place. The
observer's rule for overcoming place as a barrier to knowledge is
again to transfer responsibility for the speech to the world by making
the relationship between the speech and the world into a local relation:
20
only places at which one is present can be known. One can know a
place, as an observer, only by being there. Just as observers can
know only the present, so can they know only places at which they
h: ve been present.
18. Hence record-writers in the hospital studied tend to write less
about patients when their conditions are "stable". See Chapter III.
19« For the classic statement see Descartes, Ren£>, Discourse on
iethod, and meditation. New York: The Bobbs-I.errill Company,
especially pages 75-81* Descartes is an interesting example of
a man who believes he can know without observing.
20. Observers can also know places to which they have been. See Section 4*
Again it should be stressed that to conceive of place as a barrier
to knowledge which can be overcome by presence is not the only possible
conception of place. Jaded travellers and other cynics think all
places are basically the same and that, therefore, it is unnecessary
to go to the place to know it. Physicists can formulate laws which
are independent of place and social scientists can posit cultural
universale. Common sense actors do not always assume that they do
not know a place because they have not been there. Thus even
"newcomers" can have expectations.
The point is not some factual assertion that only places to which
one has gone can be known. The point is that insofar as one is
committed to the activity of observing, one can onl,y achieve an ob¬
servation through the grammar of suspended judgment about places at
21
which one has not been.
In ordinary usage, we consider the two meanings of "present" with
which we have been concerned to be distinct. We distinguish being here
in time (the present) and being here in space (presence). However,
the observer inhabits both spheres at once, being present in time and
in space in order to extract the world's testimony through witness.
The concept of presence is meant to capture the fact that observers
stand in the same relation to time and to place as a way of achieving
the local relation of coalescence which enables them to know. Presence
is identical with the world-as-speaker, with knowledge. The observer's
reason for being present in time is the same as his reason for being
present in space, namely to subjugate his speech, which ould only
be opinion, to the discipline of participant self-denial. Whatever
21. Observers who believe in "sampling" can be seen as limiting
their commitment to observation precisely by arguing that some
other places can be understood without one's having been there.
is foreign about space and time - however they are barriers to knowledge -
is concealed from himself by the observer in his refusal to speak of
them.
-4-
In this chapter, our task is to address the grounds for seeing
records as facts or truth. Although observing has been discussed
more directly than recording, in an important sense the task of
22
grounding records has already been at least partially accomplished.
For we shall next show how an analysis of observing is also an analysis
of recording, since the activity of observing entails the activity of
recording. . e shall discuss two questions: (l) W y an observer can
make a record (2) . hy records are necessary «t all. Neither question
is ade uately discussed in the literature. Selltiz furnishes an example
of how the record-obseiver link is usually formulated. Selltiz states
that "in recording unstructured observation, two uestions require
consideration: When should the observer make notes' How should notes
23
be kept." To ask these questions is to treat our cuestions as
already answered. That an observer should take notes presupposes,
of course, that an observer can take notes. Observers can take notes
only because they can do the kind of action we have explicated in this
chapter. That is, essential to the activity of taking notes in
Selltiz's sense is the activity of taking note in an observer's sense.
Observers can take the kind of notes we presume Selltiz would want them
to take only in so far as they can take note. Taking note is another
22. we say partially because some of the points made in the next
chapter serve to further deepen the analysis.
23. Selltiz, et al., op. cit., page 210.
word for the action of observations treating one's speech not as a
fact in its own right, not as participation, but as a product of
events. Notes, then, are nothing but a written down version of the
action engaged in by the competent observer. Observation amounts to
taking note not because concrete observers take notes but because
being an observer amounts to making a particular kind of speech.
In being an observer one is not, as we have said, participating
through one's speech. The speech one makes through observing amounts
to listening, to hearing: from things what to say about them. Thus,
the speech an observer makes amounts to taking note - not contributing
to things but merely attending to what is already there. Our analysis
of observation is also an analysis of recording in the sense that a
record is nothing but an observer's version of speech - speech which
does not make a difference but merely notes whatever is there to be
seen.
In the following quotation, we can see how Selltiz conceals the
analytic identity between observation and the kind of speech observers
make (taking note):
The best time for recording is undoubtedly on
the spot and during the event. This results
in a minimum of selective bias and distortion
through memory. There are many situations,
however, in which note-taking on the spot is
not feasible, because it would disturb the
naturalness of the situation or arouse the
suspicions of the persons observed ... Constant
note-taking may interfere with the quality of
observation. The observer may easily lose
relevant aspects of the situation if he divides
his attention between observing and riting.^4
To say that there are "many situations in which note-taking on
the spot is not feasible" is to obscure the fact that to observe ijs
24. Selltiz, op. cit., page 210.
to take note. The observer may not write it down on the spot but that
he does not is not to say that he has not taken note in the sense of
listened to what the event has to say. Indeed, he can only "decide"
between writing it down now and later because, having assimilated the
event through observation, what he would say later can be the same as
what he would say now since in both cases it is the permanent, un¬
changing event which his speech is supposed to reveal. Selltiz
worries that the observer's memory may fail him but this worry covers
over the more basic point that the observer has some thing to remember.
He only has some thing to remember because he has succeeded in making
ready so that a thing could reveal itself to him. That "constant
note-taking may interfere with observation" and. that the observer may
"divide his attention between observing and writing" make it sound as
if observing and writing are two different activities. Concretely they
are, of course, but, analytically, what the observer writes is circum¬
scribed by what he has observed. What he should write has been
determined for him by what has happened. Basically, what he should
write has already been said since it is the event which tells him what
to say about it.
The next question we want to raise is why observers must speak
at all - why a record is necessary. Given the analysis just com¬
pleted, to observe fs to make the recorder's kind of speech. Our
question now is why observing takes the form of taking note. We shall
argue that observing, to make sense, must always result in some kind
of a record. Whether the record takes the form of writings, tape
recording, pictures, or memories is irrelevant at the present level
of abstraction. Whereas methodologists emphasize the differences
between written records and memories, the former supposedly aoing the
job better than the latter, v;e have already suggested how they both
are different ways to do the same thing (take note) and we shall
suggest how they both have the same justification. The observer
seems to produce a kind of product, a set of notes or his "memories"
ana it is these that constitute the knowledge he has obtained. In
most discussions about observation it is simply assumed that ob¬
serving requires recording. Selltiz, as quoted above, by focusing
on when and how to take notes, certainly does not ask why notes are
necessary in the first place. Similarly, although Cicourel notes
that "the group's activities may not permit recording of events until
25
a considerable time between observation ana recording has elapsed",
he does not investigate why observers record. We shall ask what
there is about observing such that recording (or remembering) is
necessary.
The usual answer to this question will not be acceptable to
us. The usual answer is that observers must take notes or keep
records because their memories are fallible. As Simon puts this
positions
(Observing) ... requires immediate and detailed
reporting whenever possible. Anthropologists
try to record their field notes every day, to
minimize the chance that their memories will play
tricks on them. Police officers are also tx-ained
to take on-the-spot notes, to prevent bias and
inaccuracy from creeping in
25. Cicourel, op.cit., page 45* See also Powdermaker, Hortense,
Hollywood The Bream F ctory, London: decker and Warburg, 1951>
pages 5 and 6.
26. Simon, Julian, 3asic Research methods in Social Science, New
York, Random house, 19o9» page 88. See also Vidich, Arthur, J.,
"Participant Observation and the Collection and Interpretation
of Lata", American Journal of Sociology, volume LX, January
1955» page 360. For an argument in favour of non-human
recorders, see Jaffe, Joseph and Feldstein, Stanley, Rhythms
of Dialogue, New York: Academic Press, 1970, especially page
The common-place view that records are necessary because observers,
being human, tend to forget, begs our question. It is only note¬
worthy that observers tend to forget because observers are supposed
to remember. It is the need for remembering- which makes the
observer's forgetfulness into a problem and also makes notes
necessary as a way of overcoming the problem. Therefore, the burden
of our analysis will be to show why observers must remerr.ber' as a way
of depicting why a record (or a memory) is necessary for one to claim
he has adecuately observed. Simon's attempt to explain the need for
27
records is based on a physical fact. He thinks he can explain the
need for records by citing an obvious fact about memories, i.e. that
they "play tricks." However, while the physical fact may tell us
why memories fail, it does not tell us why memories are necessary in
the first place. We shall suggest that it is not physical facts but
the grounds of the activity of observing, as they have already been
formulated, which make remembering necessary and, therefore, make
necessary devices for remembering such as records and memories.
Why does observing always require some kind of a record? It
has already been suggested that to observe is to be able to know the
present but not the past or future. Now it must be noted that there
is an obvious defect in the knowledge of the observer, as he has been
defined to this point. The observer can know only the present.
The defect in the knowledge of the observer so defined has to do with
the obvious fact that the present becomes the past. Because the
present becomes the past, the observer stands to lose every last bit
of knowledge that he ever gained, since, when the present becomes the
past, he should, qua observer, cease to know it.
27. For a good summary of physiological literature on memory, See John,
Roy, E., Lcchanisms of Memory, New York, Academic Press, 19&7*
Given that observing requires presence, it is possible that the
observer's knowledge will become ephemeral, that he will never be
able to accumulate knowledge. It must be stressed that the fact
that observers can lose all of their knowledge is not a physiological
giv^n but a consequence of the socially organized identity of observing
itself. Forgetting becomes possible because of the various stipu¬
lations concerning the problem of knowledge and its solution, as
mentioned above, which create the possibility of observation as an
intelligible activity: first, time is passing (the present is
becoming the past), and second, observers can know only the present.
Thus, unless observing is to result in only the most transient kind of
knowledge, some device is required for freezing the observed present
before it becomes the foreign past. It is as a service to the
longevity of the present that records fit into our analysis. The
record overcomes the pastness of what was once present by converting
the present into the permanent. Records are made necessary by the
basic idea that only the present can be known.
Many writers have stated that records are characterized by
permanence. For example, Wheeler writes: "... (records) have a
28
permanence lacking in informal communication." , eick writes:
If an observer obtains a record of a natural
event ... he ... has a permanent picture of
what occurred ..."
We are noting more than the permanence of records however. ..e are now
in a position to understand why observers want a "permanent picture":
to record is to make the present into the permanent, to make the
present remain, and making the present remain becomes necessary when
28. ..heeler, op. cit., page 5»
29. Yv'eick, op. cit., page 4H»
one believes, as observers do, that when the present becomes the past
it can no longer be known.
The record thus makes the pre ent permanent and eternalizes the
event. The event speaks forever through the record, the record
being identical with the event. Just as the problematic relation
of knower to known is overcome by the itnessed but univocal speech
of the event, so do we continue to subdue any co-participation, and
therefore any doubt, by externalizing this self-same event in the
transcription which is the record.^ That we are not to co-participate
with the event in making the record is of course a nearly perfect
example of depersonalization. >»e can see, however, that the kind of
depersonalization represented by the record, i.e. the idea that the
observer should render himself speechless, is not bureaucratic mis¬
carriage, but bureaucratic necessity according to this very bureacratic
version of knowledge. Analytically speaking, the recorded past is the
present so depersonalization is necessary if the very claim t o know
anything but the present moment is to be possible.^"'"
e have described an observer's kind of speech (taking note) and
we have tried to show why he must make this kind of speech. However,
it should be clear that the kind of speech an observer is supposed to
make is very different from the opinions his whole activity is supposed
to overcome. The observer's speech (record) does not make a difference
to the event. It does not change it. Rather, it eternalizes it.
30. This is perhaps the deep ground of those who would characterize
bureaucracy as depersonalized. Insofar as bureaucracy is a
record-keepin. organization, the record will have to be kept clear
of contaraination, given that bureaucracy is among the most pointed
modern cases of organizations abiding by the distinction between
knowledge and opinion.
31. The relationship between bureaucracy and record-keeping is
discussed in more detail in Chapters IV and V.
The observer, through his speech, has not produced the event, he has
preserved it. If his speech does finally make a difference to the
event it is not so much what his speech does t£ the event. It is
what his speech does for the event. Unlike the event, the speech
lasts but what lasts as long as the speech lasts is not (in any
important sense) the speech but the event the speech is serving.
A note on Memory
This idea of records provides a more complete formulation of the
32
observer's relation to past and future. It is not enough to say
that the observer cannot know the past. He cannot knov. it qua past,
certainly, but he can know it in the form of the "formerly present"
(and, for the future, the "will be present").
Vie are offering here a special formulation of the very mundane
fact that observtrs can know the past if they were present when it was
34the present. One can remember for the record. Just as it is not
enough to say the observer cannot know the past, neither is it enough
to say the record is only something material like a past sentence or
photograph done simultaneously with the event. The event speaks
through the observer, and so any speech, so long as it can be deter¬
mined that the speech is the event's speech, can make a record.
Given the grounds discussed above, those committed to observation
would not ask whether a memory could be a record any more than they
would ask whether observation could be knowledge. Rather, the
32. bee footnote 15.
33. bee Heidegger, I..artin, An Introduction to Metaphysics, New
York, Anchor Books, 1961, page 172.
34. And the future if they will be present when it becomes the
present.
question of memory is technical and specific to particular instances:
is this memory contaminated by participation extraneous to the event's
own speech (forgetfulness, desire, the intrusion of exterior events,
etc.)? Thus, record-writers can write about the past as long as
they were present when it was the present, because we can continue
to assume that it is the event which is speaking:
I first saw the patient in November, 19&7» f°r
heartburn and constipation.
Wife visited in a.m. Lade comfortable.
Ambulated length of hail with assistance.
Refused a.m. care. Seen by Dr. Saver.
Although the writers of these notes know the past, they do not
know it qua past. They can know the past because they knew it when
it was the present and by observing and recording it they convert it
into the permanent.
Chapter III
R E C 0 R JD S AND EVENTS
50.
In Chapter II it was emphasized that the observer-recorder's kind
of presence becomes reasonable and even necessary only within a
particular conception of time and place. When this viewpoint is
developed, it has important practical implications: the simple fact
that records must be produced by "being there" predetermines certain
characteristics of records and, even, of the world. e cannot
accept the view that records are merely a passive and mechanical
reproduction of "what has happened". If it can be said that the
observer is passive, then we have tried to indicate in Chapters I and
II the very rigorous kind of v,ork which is necessary to the achievement
of this passiv ty. Nor can we accept the view that records are a
biased representation of "what has happened". The bias of records -
if it is anything - is surely not a description of what records are
but a description of one thing that can happen to some (or all) of
them, a happening which itself remains unexplicated and unprovided for
until records are provided for. Both views are subject to the same
criticism: they accept as given what records are about" - the world,
events, what has happened - and then try to formulate how" records
stand in relation to that given. By contrast v,e suggest that when
records are seen in terms of the grounds which make them possible, it
is no longer adequate to state that records reflect, whether accurately
or inaccurately, the givens of the real world, because the real world
itself comes to be shaped by the very idea of recording it.
When the grounds of recording are examined, the "real" world
ceases to be a given. Rather, the grounds which make it seem
reasonable to write records determine in advance both the characteristics
of actual records and of the "real world" as it will appear to record-
writers. It is not that records record things but that the very
idea of recording determines in advance hoy.- things will have to appear.
A record is a way of giving evidence, and e way of giving evidence
is to record what one witnesses. Consequently, insofar as the "real
world" is constituted by and through its record, it is simultaneously
constituted by and through the enforced conceptions of adequate
evidence as witnessable evidence which create and limit the activity
of observation.
This notion, that the grounds of the activity of recording
determine the nature of records and the way record-writers will see
things, is a difficult idea to grasp and to communicate."'" In
order to help the reader with the argument, we shall try first to
distinguish our viewpoint from another to which it bears superficial
similarity. Many authors have suggested that record-writers (and
historians) must decide which facts are worth recording or inter¬
preting. For example, V»eick writes:
ho recording system in current use provides an
exact reproduction of an event, yet the fact that
editing occurs is not always realized.
Schutz writes, concerning the historian's task:
The science of history has the momentous task
of deciding which events, actions, and
communicative acts to select for the inter¬
pretation ana reconstruction of "history" ,
from the total social reality of the past.
1. A very simple version of this argument was presented in
Section 4 of the last chapter when v. e tried to show how
the "permanence" of records was a characteristic made
necessary by the basic grounds of record-writers.
2. Weick, op. cit., page 408.
5. Schutz, Alfred, Collected Papers, II, The Hague: Martinus
Hijhoff, 1964, page 61.
Carr makes a similar point»
The historian is necessarily selective. The
belief in a herd core of historical facts
existing objectively and independently of the
historian is a preposterous fallacy ...4
According- to these writers, the key problem which historians and
observers face is "selectivity". Observers must decide which facts
to "select" from the myriad of "actual" facts.
Since selectivity is essentially a notion which depends upon
treating the real world as a given, i.e. as that from which the
observer must select, the problem with the idea is that it does not
go far enough. It does not go far enough because that from which
this or that is selected remains unexamined and thus the self-same
world which provides for its extractability remains unexamined as
well. For example, that selection is even possible requires among
other things a version of the world as a witnessable world. The
recorder, then, does not simply select. Rather, he relies on grounds.
These grounds offer up the possibility of selection. Selection, then,
can not be formulated as simply a problem observers face since the very
fact that observers can select constitutes an affirmation that
observers are confronting a world of potentially observable and
recordable things. V\e shall show that it is not just that the
observer must "select" certain facts and leave out others^ Rather,
the grouncb of the record-writer will force him to see all facts, both
those he selects and those he omits as having a certain form since his
grounds presuppose a particular concept of factuality. In other words
we cannot accept the view that record-writers are in a situation of
looking at "the" world and selecting parts of it. Rather, what
their world consists of is determined by their grounds. It is these
4. Carr, Edward H. Vvhat is History?. London: LacMillan, 1961, page 6
For a view closer to my own, see Collingwood, op. cit. esp. pages
20-21 where he briefly makes the argument that history presupposes
a particular version of the nature of things.
grounds which determine, for example, that the world permits a mining
operation which does not contaminate the unextracted remainder left
in the world. Lining or selecting does not make a difference; it
leaves the v.orld as it was. We note again the scaffold of observation
as a support for non-participation, leaving the world observed yet
unchanged by the fact that it has been observed and, furthermore,
leaving the recorded event recorded yet unchanged by the fact that it
has been recorded. In this sense the event is the record, the
record the event. The observer is the recorder and the event is the
record. The record is "pure", i.e. its shape is identical with the
shape of the event. Unless the world can be thought of as sets of
events which can be extracted and yet not affected by the extinction
process, the record can not equal the event. Thus, the very idea of
seeing the world as divisible into events, the very notion of "events",
is made necessary by the grounds of the activity of recording.
Teggart, on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between
records and events:
The historian concerns himself, on the one hand,
with documents, and, on the other, with happenings
or events which have taken place in the past ...5
Similarly, Cicourel distinguishes "natural occurrences" from
information about them:
Our task is similar to that of constructing a
computer that would reduce the information
obtainable by means of the perspectives of
differently situated video tapes, so that the
information (or parts of it) could be retrieved
while maintaining the fidelity of the original
natural occurrence."
Teggart, Frederick J. Theory ana iroc ss s of History, Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 196C, page 11.
6. (Jicourel, The social Organization of Juvenile Justice, New York:
John iley and Sons, 1968, page 6.
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'feggart, Cicourel, and others emphasize the distinction between
records and events recorded as a technical matter and would seem to
be attempting to reduce the technical disparity in such a way as to
affirm the analytic equivalence between record and event. We shall
investigate the connection between the idea of making a record and
the idea of an event, a happening, an occurrence, the connection which
produces their technical distinction. <Ve shall attempt to show that
the possibility that a record could represent the world or part of it
and therefore the possibility that records could be grounded as we
grounded them in Chapter II, depends on formulating the world as made
up of witnessable events, of happenings, of occurrences to which
observers can testify. From the viewpoint of the record-writer, it
is not just that he must report accurately or even select from events
in the world. Rather, the possibility and necessity of his riting
a record at all depends on his seeing the world as a set of witnessable
and extractable events.
7. bee, for example, Nagel, Ernest, "The Logic of Historical Analysis"
in Leyerhoff, Hans, ed. The philosophy of History in Our Time,
Hew York: Anchor Books, 1959» page 207* Two interesting
linguistic analyses of narratives also rest on a distinction
between the report of the event and the event. bee Sacks,
Harvey, "On the Analyzability of Stories by Children", in
Guiaperz, John and Hymes, Dell, cds., Directions in Sociolinguistics
New York: Holt, .inehart, and Winston, 1972, esp. page 330.
Labov, .illiam and Waletsky, Joshua, "Narrative Analysis; Oral
Versions of Personal Experience", in assays on the Verbal and
Visual Arts, Proceedings of the 1966 Spring Meeting, American
Ethnological Society, Seattle: University of Washington press.
Our approach to the record-event relationship is differentiated
from Labov's below.
We have said records can be conceived as solutions to the
problem of knowledge when the problem takes the form: only the
present can be known. Now we take the analysis a step further by
grounding this view. How must the world be constituted in order
that one could know the present but not the past or future, this
place but not other places?
Firstly, the observer's conceptions of time and place imply a
conception of things as transient: if what is now need not remain,
then the present would be more accessible to an observer than the past
or future. Similarly, when what is here need not be there one might
be able to have knowledge of this place but not other places.
Although these formulations of the observer's version of things are not
nearly complete they already begin to show that the observer's versions
of time and place rest on or are implicitly views about the nature of
things. In other words, the observer's idea of time and place
becomes possible when things can be pictured as coming to be and
Q
ceasing to be, and passing between here and there. The notion that
only the present can be known rests on the basic formulation that
what is here need not be there and what is now need not remain.
/
This is said not to confirm the cliche that "... the v.orld and
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everything in it is historical ...",, but to launch an examination
of how that statement fits with the activity of observation. We
have no intention of affirming a factual statement about "the" world.
8. Collingwood, op. cit., page 20.
9. Alexander, S., "The historicity of Things", in Klibansky and
Paton, op. cit., page 11.
The view of the world which is characteristic of the observer, i.e. the
view that only the present can be known, becomes possible when
witnessably extractable things are pictured as being transient and
having spatial limitations. By obviating the possibility of
omniscience (through his notion that only the present can be known),
the observer creates a problem as to what he can know, since he
cannot, according to his auspices, know all. The observer's work
is thus to organize what is extractable and then to bear witness.
Omniscience is renounced when the knower is localized in the
historicized person and knowledge is localized in historicized time
and space. This local character of knowledge as knower and known
creates the possibility of mere opinion (as that which reflects the
historicized person rather than the nature of things), and so
establishes also the possibility of observation as a means of coming
to terms with the local by extracting through witness. The
historic!zation of knowing grounds the observer as a potential failure
(to know). The achievement of adequate observation, hence knowledge,
is accomplished by identifying that which is not local (other times,
other places) and then extracting from the world that which is local
(the present, here).
It has been suggested that the observer's conception that only
the present is knowable becomes possible when (l) knowledge is
segregated from opinion, and concurrently (2) knowledge is localized.
Together they formulate the standard that what is here need not be
there and what is now need not remain. However, the historicization
of things is not enough to provide for knowledge of the present since
while it may suggest why the observer cannot know absent things, it
does not indicate why he can know present things. In addition we
have been relying on a common sense, unexplicated version of the
present as what an observer can know without defining what an observer
notion of the present is. A deeper formulation is now available:
it is not just because what is here need not be there and what is now
need not remain that observers can know only the present. More
profoundly, the observer's conception of the present is determined
by his conception of "what is", by his conception of events as
"thin, s" with an incorrigibly independent life. Observation, then,
presupposes a particular version of things, namely that things have
the quality of appearing- or showing themselves to those who are
present and bear witness when the things appear. It is this quality
of things which makes it possible for observers to see them and, in
turn, makes possible the observer's version of knowledge: that only
the present can be knovn and that he can know it only by being there.
Vie can now improve on the formulation offered in Chapter II by noting
how it is elliptical to state that observers can know only the present
Observation presupposes a particular way of defining the present,
namely not as a moment in time but as a kind of thing - a thing which
is presenting itself (to an obsexver).
If we really do have a deeper version of the observer's version
of the present now, we should expect that it will describe what
observers do better than the version that observers can know the
present in the sense of the present moment.
When record-writers, in the role of observers, can claim to
knov *!the present", they are not referring to a particular point on
some abstract continuum of time:
Hiccups stop - no evidence of continued
significant gastrointestinal bleeding.
Will be available if needed. Condition
stable at present.
krs. Sacks is feeling well, she has multiple
neurotic complaints, none of which have any
bearing on her condition at the present time.
Patient was sitting in a chair at this time.
Patient continues sleeping unless disturbed.
Less restless now than previously.
In these notes, what can be known is determined by what is showing
itself, not by what is current at the moment. In the first note,
for example, a claim to know that the hiccoughs have stopped and
that there is no bleeding would depend on the claim that these things
are not showing themselves. fthat is appearing is no bleeding and so
he who would let things tell him what to say about them, i.e. the
observer, can claim there is no "evidence" of bleeding. That is,
what constitutes evidence, what is evident to observer, is what
discloses itself to him without the need for him to participate
except through his presence. The present, in the sense thrt it is
evident to the observer, is not the moment, but the appearing, self-
revealing thing. Although these notes do, of course, make use of
chronological expressions ("at present", "at the present time", "at
this time", "now") observers have surely not decided that it is "the
present instant" or "now" by looking at a clock and determining
that time is passing. Rather, divisions between now and later,
past and future, in so far as these divisions differentiate what an
observer can know from what he cannot, must be determined by determining
what is happening to things. It does not become "latex*" for an
observer ju. t because a moment passes. As proof o'" this point, it
is not the c; se that another note becomes necessary when a moment
passes. In note four, for example, "previously" presumably refers
not to the previous moment in a clock sense but to a time when
some other thing (a restless condition) was presenting itself. For
an observer, the present in the sense in which he can claim to know
it is that time in which some thing is continuing to disclose itself.
It becomes possible for record-writers to know the present, to have a
version of "now", because some thing (the stable condition, the act
of sitting, the ability to sleep) is available to be seen by those who
would only present themselves.
If the observer conceives of the present not as an instant on
the clock, but as the time in which some thing is remaining, it
becomes clear why observers can know only the present. They can
know only the present because, to them, the present means that which
is presenting itself to them. That is, an observer's commitment to
the present does not imply a scepticism about "the next instant",
iiather it implies a commitment to the "appearance" of things as
events which present themselves for observation.
Unlike clock time, there can be no uniformity in the observer's
conception of time. If observers define "the present" by determining
whether the thing is remaining, then, depending on how: long things
are remaining, the present expands and contracts. Thus, in the
following note in which many things are "happening" there are, as it
were, many "nows":
Self A.!. care. Out of bed and walking around
unit most of day. Disagreeable to all pro¬
cedures which had to be aone. Good appetite
at breakfast. At eleven o'clock complains
of chills and shaking - did not appear to be
severe - would not stay in bed or keep blankets
on.; Medication given. Refused lunch.
12:30 a.m. patient moaning very loudly ana bringing
up vomitus.
IsOU a.m. patient continues to .vomit.
1:15 a.m. Doctor rushed to see patient ...
1:50 a.m. Patient catherized 30 cc. for
concentrated urine.
Just as the present time is, for an observer, the time during
which some thing remains, the present place is the place in which
some thing is remaining. Places "belong to the thing itself
For the observer, place is not a continuum on which are found all
conceivable locations. In Other words, place is not space.
Rather, the observer experiences a different place wherever he
experiences a different thing.
The observer's idea of place has been described by eidegger.
What he refers to as the Greek idea of place seems to us to be the
observer's concept of places
That wherein some thing becomes, refers to
what we (moderns) call "space." The Greeks
had no word for "space." This is no accident; for
they experienced the spatial on the basis not of
extension but of place; they experienced it as
chora which signifies ... that which is occupied
by what stands there. The place belongs to the
thing itself. Hach of all the various things has
11
its place. -L
For an observer to move from one place to another is not merely a
matter of his changing spatial co-ordinates, any more than moving
from one time to another is a change of chronology. It involves
moving from the presence of one thing to the presence of another
since, given his conception of place, only things can have places.
Now we can understand more clearly how an observer's kind of
presence is possible. Being present is possible because "the
present", in both time and place is not an abstractly defined set of
co-ordinates. Rather, the present is an appearing thing. As such,
the concrete kind of presence with it required of observers becomes
intelligible. Furthermore, we can now provide for Gottschalk's
10. Heidegger, op. cit., page 54*
11. Ibid, page 54» The idea that, for observers, places belong
to things, is not unfamiliar to sociologists. The notion
that observation occurs in a "setting" is the same idea.
oee vieick, o.. cit., pages 366-369.
idea of "closeness" in time, which puzzled us in Chapter I. One
can be close to a time when a time takes the form of an event which
is appearing. The record testifies to the witnessing of this
appearing and cxtractable thing.
e can also be clearer now about how the observer's kind of
passivity is possible. The observer need not participate or speak
since the event is, as it were, doing all the work for him. Since
the event is thought to show itself, the observer's job becomes to do,
in effect, nothing, so as to let the event show itself. The
observer need not speak and so need not expose himself to the con¬
tingency of opinion because there is nothing that needs to be dis¬
closed through speech. There is nothing to be disclosed because
the relevant thing (events) is disclosing itself. The minimal role
left for speech is to remember what has been disclosed after it disappears.
Again, speech in the form of records serves not to sustain participation
but to sustain non-participation by allowing us to remain silent even
in the face of the absent by convex^ting the absent into the permanently
present (records). The speech may be different from the event in that
it remains but, analytically, what remains as long as the speech
remains is the event. So although speech may be different, what
makes the difference is not the speech but the event which makes the
speech (record) possible.
We must, of course, redraw the boundaries of an observer's
knowledge in terms of this version of the present as that which is
presenting itself. First there is the possibility of clarifying
how an observer stands in relation to knowledge of the present.
Eis claim that he can know the present must now be taken to mean
that he knows about the current. Knowing things by observation is
not a matter of whether the things are current or not. It is a matter
of whether the things are presenting themselves or not. In the
following notes record-writers can express ignorance about the
chronological present for the simple reason that the chronological
present is not showing what it is:




The iiAI uptake has been done. Results?
Prosthesis: Unable to obtain info. Patient in coma.
Some aspects of the chronological present remain unclear to these
observers: the clinical picture, whether there is epigastic tender¬
ness, what the test results are, and whether the patient has prosthesis.
However to argue from these examples to the conclusion that observers
cannot know the present is to misunderstand the observer's version of
the present. Even in these notes what can be known remains that
which is presenting or disclosing itself. In the first note, the
observer lets himself be governed by the clinical picture. Since
the picture that presents itself is unclear, so is the observer. He
will not venture beyond what is presenting itself and so his ignorance
affirms rather than denies the observer's rule that only what is
present can be known. In all of these notes, the writers continue
to follow the observer's rule by letting their speech (record) be
guided by the transparent, appearing thing. The observer will speak
about that which appears and refuse to speak about that which does not
appear. As expressions of knowledge are licensed by the appearance
of things so expressions of ignorance (cuestions, doubt) are licensed
by the absence of such an appearance.
63.
It has just been suggested that aspects of the chronological
present cannot be known by observers if they do not show themselves.
Correlatively, the chronological past and the chronological future
are potentially knowable by observation if they present themselves,
oigns, remnants and, we might add, records, are things which, although
ti.ey may be from the chronological past or future, are within an
observer's grasp if they show themselves. It is of course perfectly
true that a sign or a remnant may lead an observer to incorrectly
interpret the future or the past but it is also true that appearances
can be deceiving in the chronological present so the possibility of
being wron^ does not seem to furnish us with a principle which would
allow us to limit observers to the chronological -resent. what
seems to be true in all time periods is that observers are supposed
to limit themselves to what is showing itself rather than to make of
the thing "more" than is there. In the light of this point that
observers are not restricted to the chronological present, we can add
an additional criticism to the one made earlier concerning Hiley's
statement that observing is inapplicable to action taking~place in
the past. It is not just that "inapplicable" is too weak a word.
Now we can see that her view is possibly wrong unless she specifies
clearly that by the past she means that which is no longer appearing.
Having shown how the idea that what an observer can know is
that which presents itself serves to deepen the idea that observers
can know the present, we want next to depict the "news" contained in
the idea that observers can know about things which present themselves
by contrasting it with more familiar views. Our point is that most
accounts of what an observer can know fail to formulate the "what" at
all. Ve have already emoted Selltiz's vague idea that observers
notice "what is going on around them". Hichardson is equally
vague when he writes: "... observers watch, count, listen to and
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even smell objects or phenomena as they take place." He has
no version of what the "objects" or "phenomena" are. It is not
just that observers watch phenomena but that the very idea of
watching presupposes a particular version of exactly what a phenomenon
is: A phenomenon is a thing which reveals itself to he who would
only make ready. If all that is required of the observer is
making ready so as to let the thing disclose itself, lichardson's
grounds for linking watching, listening, counting, and even smelling
become clear. If a phenomenon discloses itself, then "seeing" it
amounts to merely being able to receive what it gives off. If the
purpose is to be such a receptacle, watching, listening, and even
smelling would seem to be different ways to do the same job. What
all these human faculties have in common is that they are ways of
being there without treating one's own being there as anything but a
way of takin; what is already there. Finally although counting could
be formulated as a kind of speaking, it is not so much a contribution
to events as a way of disclosing properties already there. In
counting, what does not count (what is no-thing) is he who makes
the count. Hence uichardson is right to connect counting v.ith
observing. In counting, as in observing, the fret of one's own
speech is not supposed to count.
As a second example of sociological vagueness about the
observer's phenomena, let us consider doode's characterization of
13
what an observer can know as what is "out there". He gives no
12. dichardson, Stephen et al., Interviewing London: Basic
Books, 19^5, page 9»
15. Uoode, .,illiam, Explorations in Social Theory, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973» page 10.
formulation of the "what" that is "out there" nor of why this "what"
is located "out there". ¥;hat discloses itself is "out there" in
the sense that the observer knows, not by participating with the
world (i.e. by being a part of it), but by differentiating self and
world in order to treat world as that which can be known and self as
that which can do the knowing. The observer accomplishes this
differentiation by treating his own speech not as part of the world
(out there) but as that which will reflect, as mere product, his
contact with the world. For such unidirectional contact between
speech and world to be possible, the world must be formulated as that
which presents itself and the speech as that which merely captures
(records) the presentation. To say the world is "out there", then,
amounts to an implicit characterization of the action of observation.
The world is out there to an observer because the observer constitutes
himself by refusing to participate, by refusing to treat _hijs own
speech as part of the world. The refusal is possible by formulating
the world, not as including one's participation through speech, but
as that which will be disclosed through speech.
Both Goode and Richardson fail to describe what an observer
can know because terms like "out there", and "phenomenon" are devoid
of content until what observers might mean by these terms is
explicated. Instead of saying that an observer can see only what
is "there", we say that what an observer conceives of as "there"
is determined by his grounds. What is there is what discloses
itself without any participation on his part. Unless what an
observer can see is explicated and formulated then saying that an
observer is limited to what is there or to phenomena amounts to
saying that an observer can see what he can see. Of course he
can, but the intellectual task is to describe what it is that
observers can see and not just to repeat tautologically that they
can see what they can see. Our point is most emphatically not,
then, the banal one that observers can see what is visible. We
are not just asserting that observers are limited to the visible.
Rather we are trying to characterize exactly what is visible to an
observer. What can an observer see? It is not just that he can
see what is visible but that what is visible to him is anything
which is thought to reveal itself.
-2-
The vital connection between the idea of an observer and the
idea that things will disclose what must be said about them, can be
illustrated more forcefully by looking at the connection in terms
of the records which are an observer's products. The common con¬
ception is that records correspond to the world or that records make
selections from the world. Our conception, on the other hand, is
that it becomes possible for a record to correspond to the world only
when "the world" is formulated as itself revealing the things which
must be said about it. This is not to say that the v/orld does
disclose itself. Rather: insofar as one can formulate the world as
made up of things which present or fail to present themselves, it
thereby becomes possible for a record to "represent" the world.
It is neither correct or incorrect, then, to treat records as
corresponding to the world. The proper statement of the relationship
of records to the world is that, in so far as one wants to see
records as corresponding to the world, one must treat the world as
revealing or presenting what must be said about it.
The first point is the most basic: the rule for deciding what
can be said in the record is that what can be said must be limited
to what is thought to disclose itself. The way the observer denies
the contribution of his own speech is by treating his speech as made
necessary by "what has happened", by what is "revealed to him".
Interestingly, this is not to say that what is revealed to an
observer is necessarily the "physical" aspect of things. The
"physical", exactly like the "mental" may or may not present itself
and it is.whether some thing presents itself rather than whether
some thing is "physical" which determines whether an observer can
see it. v.e are definitely not saying that observers can see only
a particular kind of things, e.g. "physical" things. Rather, the
point is that observers are restricted to seeing all things in terms
of what those things reveal themselves to be. That is, if the
"mental" is thought to disclose itself, then it is just as suitable a
topic, then it is just as much within an observer's province as the
"physical". Observers do not restrict themselves to the "physical".
They restrict themselves to the look or appearance of anything
(physical, mental, etc.) which is to say they restrict themselves to
saying about anything only what that thin, makes it necessary for
them to say.
Those who think observers are limited to "physical" things^
might think that these records are observations
Patient looks more alert and speaks in
sentences like ",ut it on the table."
Patient looks well - still has copious
purulent drainage from drain site.
Ankles appeared swollen.
14. The view that observers are limited to physical things is
expressed as follows by Sjoberg and Nett:
... just what do social scientists observe? They
observe physical behaviour, such as walking, waving
of arms, facial expressions, and patterned sounds,
and the results of physical behavior, such as v.riting
or tools.
Sjoberg and Nett., op. cit., page 33« See also pages 160-161.
whereas these may seem like "inference":
Patient concerned, about forthcoming surgery;
about need for private duty nurses.
Comfortable.
Seemed in good spirits.
She tries to be helpful to nurses.
More goal directed than yesterday.
Patient very upset about being in hospital during holiday.
Those who support the formulation that observers are limited to
"physical" things could, of course, produce a description of these
data which would be consistent with their viewpoint. Presumably
they would argue that the second set of examples shov that actual
record-writers are not "just" observers. That is, in these records
actual record-writers are engaging in two processes: making inferences
as well as observations. Note, though, that the data provide no
particular support for this view. There is no evidence that the
record-writers are more uncertain in the second set of examples than
they are in the first. If it is considered noteworthy that the
patient only "seems" to be in good spirits, why is it not equally
noteworthy that the ankles only "appear" to be swollen? Why say
that record-writers are inferring in the second set of cases but ob¬
serving in the first? We say that all of these records are identical
in that the observers are letting themselves be guided by what they
take to be revealing itself. In all cases, the record-writer's own
speech is supposedly produced by what his subject is telling, him
to say. Of course it is correct that in the first set of cases
the topic is physical things, whereas in the second set the topic
is mental things. However in both cases the observer writes about
a topic by letting, his speech be guided by what the thing (ankles
on the one hand, spirits on the other) shows itself to be. Observers
are not restricted to any one kind of thing. They are restricted
to the treatment of all kinds of things as nothing but what those
things reveal themselves to be.
Besides the basic issue of what can legitimately be said in a
record, other aspects of records are illuminated by the idea that a
record reports what discloses itself.
(1) The world must be formulated as telling one what must be
said about it for short notes to be able to "represent" long periods
of times
llsOO - 7»U0 Slept well.
11-7t50 medication given for sleep. Appears to have slept.
7:00-3:30 Had shower. Out of bed walking.
3:00-11:30 continues to improve.
The concept of events makes it possible to treat these records, short
as they are, as complete. A phrase like "slept well" or "had
shower" could represent an entire day if to represent a day means,
not to report every second of the day, but to record what happened.
Even a short record can be complete if completeness is defined as
depending not on the definitiveness of the record but as depending on
the simple contingency of whether anything has happened. Thus, by
seeing the world as events and making speech depend on events one
has made it possible to say enough without, for example, saying
enough to satisfy an audience or solve a problem. Satisfying an
audience or solving a problem is incidental in the kind of speech
that records exemplify since one's only standard for what one has to
say is what events permit one to say.
(2) Because it is the events which speak, it is even possible
for a record to say nothing and yet be adeeuate. A record-writer
can have nothing to say and yet produce an adequate record because
it is not he who is thought to be responsible for what is said. What
is said is the responsibility of the events and so if nothing happens,
then that very absence of anything can be a topic of the record:
3:00-11:30 no complaints offered.
11:00-7:00 nothing unusual.
7:00-3:30 Ivirs. S. has been quiet all day. Did
not verbalize any concerns.
If the world is that which happens and fails to happen and if the
observer himself is not thought to be something, it becomes possible
to see nothing. Nothing is possible when something is some thing
which pr sents or discloses itself. While it might be said that
there is always something in the record, namely the record itself, to
make such a point is to forget that from an observer's viewpoint his
own speech (record) is supposed to amount to nothing since it is
supposed to merely reflect things (or the absence of things) external
to itself. Here we have a partial formulation of how it is possible
for the social scientists mentioned in Chapter I to find records
troublesome. Records can be troublesome because they can give no
information and, in turn, they can give no information partly because
they are themselves formulated not as information in their own right
but as about other things. One version of why our study does not
find records troublesome is that instead of treating them as information
about other and potentially absent things like events, we treat them
as themselves th thing to be studied.
(3) Finally, we shall differentiate our account of the record-
event link from that given by Labov and Yaletsky in their analysis
of narratives. They define a narrative as a "method of recapitulating
past experiences by matching of the verbal sequence of clauses to the
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sequence of events which actually occurred." They might say that
the following note is a narrative because it "recapitulates experience
in the same order as the original eventsi"^
Patient had cardiac arrest. Immediate cardio¬
pulmonary resusci^tative measures instituted
but failed to revive the patient. Patient
pronounced dead at 10:56 k.k. on y/28/69.
By making the important issue whether the clauses of the account
have the same time order as tne original events, they presuppose too
much. How can a set of sentences have a time order, for example?
Perhaps they would say this is possible because the sentences refer
back to the events, but exactly what does that mean? They must
describe how one thing (a sentence) can refer back to (recapitulate)
another thing (events). This is the issue we focus on. A narrative
is possible in so far as things (events) are thought to disclose
themselves. Therefore, speech can be thought of not as adding some
thing but as repeating what is there. Speech can repeat a thing if
a speech need not be thought of as itself a thin{ but can be "about"
other things. This view of speech is accomplished by riddin, speech
of any contribution except the contribution of making a record. The
sameness of narrative and event is not adequately described as a
matching, of order of sentences in the report to order of events.
The narrative is the same as the vent in the more fundamental sense
that it is. the event, since the narrative is supposed to be nothing
but a disclosure of what has already happened. Kvents are "original"
not just in Labov and Vjaletsky's narrow sense that they happened first
but in the sense that events are thought to originate, that is,
produce, the speech about them, thus making the happening that is
speech not itself original but a repeat.
15. Labov and Waletsky, op. cit., page 20.
16. Ibid, page 21.
In the final section of this chapter, v,e shall note an impli¬
cation of the connection between events and observation. The
grounds of observing and recording, as we have formulated them, make
it necessary that observers see only one thing at a time. Using
the grounds of the ctivity of recording, we shall attempt to account
for the "one at a time" char cter of observation. Of course, the
notion that observers cannot see two things at once has been available
for some time in psychologically oriented discussions of 'attention".
Boring writes:
... There really is a fundamental fact of attention.
The fact of attention is that consciousness is
limited. Attention to one "thing" requires
inattention to others. If you are paying
attention to the old lady in the pev, in front
of you, presumably you. re not payint attention
to the sermon. '
Vernon writes:
It seems possible that we cannot attend to two events
happening at one and the same moment, and perceive
both of them clearly. Thus it was found that it was
impossible to take in two pieces of information presented
simultaneously, one visually and the other aurally ...
unless the two events can be combined in some way, one
must be overlooked.1^
Usually, to explain why observers can see only one thing at a time,
the psychologists resort to physiological facts. Thus, Boring believes
that:
At a given moment a person can think of so much and
no more because he has just so much brain with which
to do the thinking ...19
17. Boring, Cdwin, The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness, New
fork: The Century Company, 1933, page 194*
18. Vernon, lagdalen, "Perception, Attention, and Consciousness",
in Bahan, i aul, ed., Attention. Princeton: Van Nostrand,
1966, pages 38-39«
19. Boring, op. cit., page 198.
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As Sanders describes it, the single-channel theory states:
that while processing one signal, one is
blocked for others.^
Unlike the psychologists, we will not rest our argument that
the observer can see only one thing at a time on physiological
grounds. Rather, the key question for us to examine is how the
observer's knowledge organizes his attention: 1) what is an observer's
conception of a thing? 2) What is an observer's conception of "at a
time"?
Answers to these uestions were implicit in our previous discussion.
An observer conceives of a thing as an event. Psychologists who try
to account for "one at a time" while using the furniture of material
objects as their "things", are missing the essential point that, for
21
an observer, these objects are not things. Rather, events are
things. If an event and not just an ordinary object is, for an observer,
a thing, then the question of the possibility of "one at a time"
becomes transformed. It is no longer a question of the observer's
physiologic;/1 ability to hold two obj cts in focus at once. It is a
question of whetr.er, given the socially organized nature of events and
observers, this nature would enable one observer to see two events at
once.
To decide this issue, we must move to a second question: what is
an obse ver's conception of "at once"? As was suggested in Section 1,
an observer's idea of "at once" is not determined by looking at a
clock or map. An observer decides that it is "now" rather than later
20.. Sanders, A.F., Attention and Performance, Amsterdam North-
Holland Publishing Company, 19&7» page 3«
21. See Boring, op. cit., page 195«
because some thing is continuing to "happen". He decides that it is
22
"later" when some other thing begins to happen. In other words,
an observer's idea of what time it is, is dependent on his idea of
what is happening. He will see the time as the present, as now,
as long as he continues to see one thing happen. When he sees
another thing happen, he will see the time as "later". Thus it
is inconceivable that an observer can see two things at once not
because of physiological limitation but because the observer's idea
of "at once" requires that he see only one thing. Whenever he sees
two things, he will also see two times since, for him, the idea of
two times requires the fact of two things. For an observer, the
idea of two things at one time is analytically inconceivable.
It should be noted that we are not saying, as do Gestalt and
other psychologists, that observers tend to unify their diverse
23
perceptions. It is not a matter of perception at all. he are
saying that whatever observers see as one thin, they will also see as
one time. One at a time is not necessary for observation as a conse¬
quence of the simultaneous perception of wholes in parts; the necessity
of one at a time resides instead in the identity of one thin;- with one
time.
exactly the same point can be made with regard to place. The
observer cannot see two things in one place beer use the idea that he
seeinc one thing means also that he is also in one place. His idea
that he is seeing two things would force him to conceive of himself as
in two places.
22. See Mach, Ernest, The Analysis of Sensations, NY: hover
Publications, 1959» pages 249-250.
23. See for example, Kohler, Wolfgang, Gestalt Psychology, hew
York: Leveright Publishing, 1947» page 103.
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In earlier chapters we have been concerned, with the grounds of the
activity of recording. Now we shift our focus to the uses of records.
However, the grounds of records and the uses of records are not the
different issues they may appear to be since what makes records
possible (grounds) provide for and delimit the uses to which records
may be ut. .Furthermore, even the fact that records are the kind of
thing which it is appropriate and possible to use will be shown to be
a consecuence of the grounds of records. We shall find, then, that
the v^ rious concerns connected with the use of records can be understood
as another manifestation of the grounds of the activity of recording.
The analysis to be done now vill serve to justify further our point
that it is necessary to provide the basic grounds of records since it
will be shown that a successful analysis of the uses of records
re<aires reference to the grounds of the activity of recording. e
begin our discussion of how records are used with a characte■ization
of those who re it ortant users of medical records - bureaucrats.
-1-
1 he distinction between opinion and knowledge and the consequent
desire to control sp* ech, which ground the observer's interest in
presence,"'" find derivative exjjression in the bureaucratic concern
with appearance (tho recorded record) and reality (the truth of the
recorded record). In each case, the recognition of the contingent
or conventional character of speech - its problematic adequacy with
regard to whether it is faithful to the event which it is about -
1. For the argument that a distinction between knov.ledge and opinion
grounds observation, see Chapter II section 3 and Chapter III,
section 1. Ve shall be suggesting in this chapter that, just as
the observer uses the event to control his speech, the bureaucrat
uses the record to control his.
gives rise to the attempt to void this contingency by voiding any
participation through speech in the recording of the event.
The difficulty with presence as a solution to the problem of
knowledge is that records are used by persons who are not present.
Consequently, the user is faced with the question of hov to re-
achieve in his use the purity of the original record in the face
of (l) his absence at the point when the event has presented itself
and (2) his own capacity to contaminate the record by participating
through speech. The user's problem of imperfect or incomplete
speech is the same as the observer's (they are members of the same
knowledge-opinion community). Potentially the user shares the
observer's remedy of eliminating the problem by eliminating the
speech which equivocates the nature of the event. However, the
user is confronted with a special difficulty as a x'esult of the
observer's way of solving the problem; how is the user supposed to
achieve the silence necessary for him to be able to listen to the
record? How might he resolve the problem of participant speech,
when the opportunity to accomplish this through presence is by
definition closed to him? In a way, all bureaucracy can be seen
as an attempt to create a method for the reduction of contingency,
imperfection, and error, an attempt which is re-presented in the
bureaucrat-as-user's effort to reduce his participation in the
reading, of the record.
It should be noted that we are not discussing isolated instances
in which records are patently erroneous or flawed, or where adminis¬
trator's explicitly address standards of record-keeping. The point is
that the very ossibility of a record emanates from a conception of
speech as conventional, dangerous, and opinionated, and the concomitant
attempt to forestall this human danger by the creation of a circumstance
in which knowledge can be received as a gift from the events which
are thought to be the source ana substance of knowledge. This is
to say, then, that every .record displays the abiding observational-
bureaucratic concern regarding the contamination of the record
through participant speech. Given that records are speech, of
course, and therefore only contingently adequate, it is the bureaucrat'
job as a user of records to continuously and assiduously repair each
and every instance of the contingency which records inevitably are.
It is of course true that administrators (like sociologists) find
some records more adequate than others. However our point is that
every such finding, (whether of adequacy or inadequacy) presupposes a
solution to the basic problem of achieving a relationship to records,
a solution which does not involve speaking to and hence contaminating
the record in spite of the fact that being absent at the original
event, administrators are seemingly unable to decide whether records
are adequate or not.
Generally, then, the bureaucrat sees the record's speech (since
it is speech) as potentially unreal, as no more than an appearance.
In a variety of ways which we shall specify in detail, bureaucratic
work consists of remedying the contingency of the record by
regenerating, bureaucratic speech as a technical matter in the service
of the events which are real. For example, as we shall show,
bureaucrats try to conceive of their speech as generated by records
in the same way that obsez'vers treat their speech as generated by
events. In addition, as we shall show, bureaucrats try to subject
their speech to events by formulating themselves as subject to
observers. By making speech secondary, artificial, and only
technically necessary, the bureaucrat makes his speech subservient
to that which it is about. If the user asks himself how to preserve
the record from contamination, he can produce an answer by re¬
organizing the idea of speech from that which originates to that
which follows, in this case that which follows from records.
The bureaucrat prevents himself from speakin, by making his
speech into a thing at the disposal of its subject. We might
express this point by saying that the bureaucrat's problem is to be
able to use the record. It sounds banal, perhaps, but now we are
in a position to understand better what the idea of usin, means. It
means to be able to establish the kind of relationship in which ego
(bureaucrat) can conceive of alter (record) as an object which, like
a ripe apple, is there for the picking. To use some thing is to
treat it as self-sufficient, finished, and so available for the
relationship we call use rather than the relationship v.e call parti¬
cipation. To treat something as use-able is to be able to stop
thinking (s eaking) about it. The bureaucrat's problem is that
he must somehow achieve this using relationship with records even
though, through his absence, the record has seemingly become a
questionable thing. The bureaucrat must somehow move from
questioning (speaking to, participating with) records to listening
to records. The bureaucrat must listen to the record so that the
only speech which ensues becomes the exclusive domain of the record.
One can understand the exasperation of administrators as listeners,
listeners who are devoted to certain standards (of reality in our
case) but who cannot control the performances (records) which are
measured in terms of these standards. What appears (the record)
may not be real (the event), and the bureaucrat is without the
resource (presence) to decide.
In this chapter and the next we shall try to describe in detail
some of the ways in which bureaucrats subjugate their speech to the
record. e shall begin with the rather routine observation that
bureaucratic control requires supervision. However, even this
observation will seem problematic to us when it is applied to the
activity of record-keeping since it raises the question of how
supervision of record-making can be conducted in such a way that it
is consistent with the ideal of speechlessness. How can the
bureaucrat supervise without deciding, participating, and speaking
and how can he speak when, being absent at the original event, his
speech would not be controlled?
i,.any writers have, of course, identified supervision as a major
feature of bureaucracy. As Weber writes:
The principles of office hierarchy and of
levels of graded authority mean a firmly
ordered system of super-., and subordination
in which there is a supervision of the lower
offices by the higher ones.2
Etzioni, too, emphasizes the feet that bureaucratic structures
require supervision:
Most organizations most of the time cannot rely
on most of their participants to carry out
their assignments voluntarily ... The parti¬
cipants need to be supervised, the supervisors
themselves need supervision, and so on, all
the way to the top of the organization. In
this sense, the organizational structure is
one of control, and the hierarchy of control is
the most central element of the organizational
structure.5
2. Weber, op. cit., page 197 •
3. Etzioni, araitai, "Organizational Control Structure", in
March, James, ed., Handbook of Organizations, Chicago:
Rand 4 crlally, 1965, page 650.
Like supervision, record-keeping is an important element of
bureaucratic organization. Weber writess
The management of the modern office is based
upon written documents ('the files') which .
are preserved in their original or draught form.
.Furthermore, researchers have often looked at the relationship
between these two facets of bureaucracy. In a famous analysis,
Blau has shown how records play an important role in the supervisory
5
process. .rikson and Gilbertson suggest that medical records
can be used by supervisors and others in order to evaluate personnels
The dossier is not only a record of a particular
patient; it is a record of the personnel who
have contributed materials to it and a record
of the institution. Among the most interested
consumers of dossiers, then, are administrators
trying to monitor operations of the plant,
teachers trying to measure the progress of
students, attorneys trying to keep informed
about legal difficulties, supervisors trying to
evaluate the performance of the staff, researchers
engaged in a variety of investigations and so on.6
Yiihat is being said here? Low can a record be a record of its maker
rather than its subject, and why would this kind of record interest
an administrator? Originally, we had the event and only the event
speaking to us. how we come upon the possibility that the recorder
is also making an appearance as the maker of the record, vhich raises
a question about the relation of this to our first formulation
(presented in chapters I, II, and III) that the event is the sole
participant (analytically) and so the record is not a record of the
recorder. It remains to work through the Ehrikson and Gilbertson
4. v.eber, op. cit. p. 197* See also .heeler, op. cit. passim,
i.erton, op. cit., pages 342—343.
5. Blau, op. cit., pages 36-55*
6. xikson, Kai and Gilbertson, Daniel, "Case lecords in the
Dental hospital", in Y.Tieeler, op. cit., page 399-
phrase "record of the institution" to show how it is another instance
of the knowleage-opinion distinction, and so is compatible with our
earlier formulation. To anticipate, treating a record as a record
of the institution will turn out to be an administrator's way of
using, the record given (l) his absence at the original event and
(2) his commitment to non-participation. That is, the administrator
converts the record into the maker's record in order to make it subject
to a kind of supervision which will not require participation.
It is undoubtedly true, as Blau and hrikson and Gilbertson note,
that supervisors can use records to evaluate personnel. -However, a
prior aspect of the relationship between supervision and record¬
keeping is that, for the bureaucrat who was not present, record¬
keeping surfaces as a phenomenon which poses for him the bureaucrat-
as-user's problemj how to assert and then solve the appearance-reality,
knowledge-opinion distinction. The bureaucrat looks to some method
for achieving the distinction in order that his (institutional) use
of the record can be controlled by that method. Perhaps his use can
be controlled by his controlling the recorder - in effect by his
becoming the observer. As we shall explicate below, supervising
the recorder may be a method for bringing the bureaucrat to the event
by achieving analytic identity with the recorder. We shall examine
this possibility as a more rigorous formulation of the conventional
sociological statement that in bureaucracies the functions of super¬
vision and record-keepinf;, are p< ramount.
We launch our investigation of the supervision-record user link
by considering an obvious requirement of supervision. ; erton has
pointed out that "visibility of both norms and of role-performance
7
is required if the structure of authority is to operate effectively."
7. Lerton, op. cit., page 340*
82.
Loreoveri
... effective and stable authority involves
the functional requirement of fairly full
information about the actual (not the
assumed) norms of the group and the actual
(not the assumed) role-performance of its
members.®
ilerton is writing about the behaviour of persons, including persons who
make and keep records. To achieve the appearance - reality distinction
the bureaucrat has to organize it with regard to the production of
records, v.hioh is to say that for the bureaucrat to "know" rather than
"opine" he needs to generate a collection of ctions which-will re¬
produce the knowledge that is potential in the record. In common
parlances what would an administrator have to know to evaluate a
record? Given the obvious purpose of records, i.e. to represent
events, in order to decide whether a record was adequate, an adminis¬
trator would presumably have to decide whether it was true. adminis¬
trators must determine whether what the record reported has, in fact,
happened.
As has been emphasized, however, the idea of recording requires
that only those who are present can know what ha ened. Thus, in
so far as they are committed to the grounds which make it reasonable
to record, supervisors can never know whether a given record is true.
Those who were not present cannot know what happened and cannot
evaluate records in terms of their accuracy without (l) ignoring the
very basis of their whole enterprise or (?) transforming the idea of
presence so as to warrant a different but faithful sense of knowledge.
While it would be simple for us to opt for the first option and so
write off bureaucracy as just another case of self-contradictory
group behaviour,, a careful examination reveals that bureaucracy
generates a coherent and complementary display of ground and action.
8. Ibid., page 341.
Recalling i.erton's statement that to be in a stable position of
authority requires "fairly full information" about the object of
control, we can see the problem which administrators face. Adminis¬
trators and clerks who would supervise records do not have the same
option that, for example, referees supervising football matches do.
Being present, the referee can simply decide (see) that play goes against
the rules. However, for a supervisor to decide that a record is
imperfect, i.e. untrue, would seem to violate the basic idea that
knowing what happened requires presence.
Ron-observers, such as administrators and. record room clerks, would
therefore seem to be in a position of having to assess records (because
as bureaucrats they must assess their bureaucracy's products) without
being able to do so. Although there is an obvious standard in terms
of which the assessment of records could be made, i.e. the truth,
administrators and clerks, qua non-observers, cannot apply the
standard. Administrators• and clerks' ignorance of the truth of
records is a feature of the structure of the record-keeping system
rather than a property of particular individuals. Their i;qnorance is
given by the fact that, although they are involved in the record¬
keeping system, they are not observers.
Because the administrators' ignorance is structurally determined,
it would seem to be an irremediable aspect of the record-keeping
system. Although Blau and Scott state that administrators "seek to
widen the sphere of (their) influence over employees beyond the
9
controlling power that rests on the legal contract or formal sanctions",
9. Blau, Peter and Scott, W. Richard, Formal Organizations,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963» pages 140-141.
administrators could not extend their range of control to include the
assessment of the truth of records without violating the basic
principle that only presence leads to knowledge. Thus, the
administrator's dilemma is that he must account for the record as
bureaucracy's product while at the same time his absence during
recording makes it impossible, according to the version of knowledge
which gives rise to recording in the first place, that he can
responsibly provide such an account. This is not to disagree with
31au and Scott, of course, but it is to suggest that their statement
is too sanguine. Granted the administrator's desire to widen his
sphere, we want to know how it is possible for him to include within
his sphere even such a bureaucratically ordinary object as a record
since iiis absence would seem to make any influence or control on his
part unwarranted. In addition, if it is true that bureaucrats seek
to "influence" record-keeping, the nature of such influence remains
to be specified since the very idea of influence seems to go against
the concept of a record as independently produced by events.
-3-
Having described the administrator's dilemma, we are now in a
position to look at his solutions. Two solutions will be described
in detail. (l) Administrators can assess records indirectly by
concerning themselves with the "reliability" of record-writers.
(?) vhen administrators do assess records directly, they assess them
in terms of completeness rather than truth.
The first solution sustains the fundamental tenet that non-
observers cannot know what happened and observers can, while
10. The second solution is discussed in the next chapter.
simultaneously rejecting the possible consequence that non-observers
are ignorant concerning what happened. Instead of assuming the
posture of ignorance, non-observers can see themselves as depending
upon or relying on observers. Relying on observers is a device which
makes it possible that non-observers can know what has happened, without
at the same time violating the idea that, qua non-observers, they
should be incapable of such knowledge. By being able to "rely", non-
observers make it unnecessary that they remain ignorant even though
they were not present. At the same time, they are not violating the
idea that only presence can lead to knowledge. The fact that they
must rely on observers rather than know "on their own" is an acknowledge¬
ment of the principle that only presence can lead to knowledge.
We can make a more general point. It is no accident that non-
observers must rely on observers. Non-observers are put in the
position of having to rely on observers because of the grounds of the
activity of observing. Given that only those who are present can
know what happened, unless non-observers can rely on observers, only
events which had been personally observed could be known. Thus,
unless knowledge is to take a very private form, the basic idea that
observing depends on presence requires the complementary idea that
non-observers can rely on observers.
Reliability effectively achieves bureaucratic presence by
negating the difference between the one who records and the one who
uses the record. The inter-action which is reliability reaffirms
a commitment to distinguishing between presence and absence and hence
between knowledge and opinion, but it achieves this reaffirmation by
re-presenting the observer and bureaucrat as analytically identical,
such that the real can make its appearance ecually to observer and
bureaucrat. The action they are to do is different: the observer
observes, the bureaucrat uses; the observer records, the bureaucrat
supervises; the observer works to get into position, the bureaucrat
to control. But these differences in action are generated by the
shared commitment to the difference between knowledge and opinion
and the shared commitment to attaining knowledge by refusing to
speak so as to let the event disclose itself. The reliability of
the observer, in which he becomes an extension of the bureaucrat's
outer reach, thus brings the bureaucrat to the event and dissolves
the problem of presence-absence while maintaining the distinction
which had originally made it a problem. Such a formulation enlivens
and deepens the notions of interdependence and division of labour,
terms which are so common but unexamined in the literature on
organizations. If bureaucrat and observer form a division of labour,
we can note that what is decisive about the division is not that they
have two different jobs but that they go about doing the same be sic
job (not participating) in different ways, the one by relying, the
other by being reliable. Focus on their differences would thus
be deceptive since it would hide the fact that their differences
are produced by a shared commitment. Aa for "interdependence" it
is doubtful that that is an adequate term to characterize the
observer-administrator relationship made possible by the idea of
reliability. First of all, interdependence probably suggests some
sort of symmetry whereas in this case, instead of both depending,
the one depends while the other must be dependable. Second, rather
than interdependence, their relationship is better characterized as one
of identity since it is analytic identity which they produce through
relying and being rely-able. The administrator does not just depend
on the observer, he becomes the observer by being able to rely on
It has been suggested that the possibility of relying on
observers allows non-observers to know about events they have not
witnessed without violating the principle that knowledge can be
obtained only by those who are present. Bureaucrats bring the
possibility into being by the method of controlling observers
through the grammar of evaluation. Non-observers can and do
convert the fact that they are relying on observers into a method
of evaluation. Instead of deciding whether records are true, non-
observers can decide (discuss) whether record-writers are rely-able".
The bureaucrat changes the topic from record to record-keeper, a move
which is perfectly consistent with his notion that he can know through
relying. By making the observer into the topic, he gives himself
licence to speak. He can speak because his topic is not what
happened. His topic is his attempt to control those who let him
know what happened. with this new topic, everything- he says, every
attempt to exercise control over observers, is not an expression of
his independence and therefore a contaminating influence on the
event. Rather, the administrator's speech expresses his dependence
on the observer and therefore the event. Speech about reliability,
which ve shall show to be so characteristic of administrators, emerges
as a clear-cut example of the point made e.-.rlier that the administrator,
like the observer, attempts to subject his speech to the event. The
bureaucrat wants a method for controlling speech, i.e. he wants a
method which is not speech. How can he achieve this speechlessness?
Although concretely the administrator is talking, by talking about
observer reliability, his message is that he is submitting his
speech to the sovereignty of he who can know, and he is identifying
the knower as he who can afford to be silent because the event tells
him what to say. The administrator is saying that he can only know
through relying and therefore that the source of his knowledge is
not his own speech but the observer's speech and, ultimately, the
event which permits the observer to speak.
What is being offered here is a new formulation of a well known
fact: whenever observation is used as a means of obtaining knowledge,
» the reliability of observations becomes an issue. Almost all dis¬
cussions about observation or recording mention the problem of
reliability. For example, Selltiz rites that "A good measurement
procedure must be ... reliable.Cannel and Kahn write:
Scarcely less important than validity is
reliability, which has to do with the ^
stability and equivalence of a measure.
Weick:
Obsei'vational methous are more vulnerable to
the fallibilities of human perceivers than
almost any other method.^
And Nagel:
... the undeniable difficulties that stand
in the way of obtaining reliable knowledge
of human affairs because of the fact that
social scientists differ in their value ,,
orientations are practical difficulties. 4
Takin, bagel's assertion seriously, we might wonder why, if the
difficulties are practical, they are also "undeniable". If the
difficulties can be remedied practically why do they so persistently
appear? why don't they just go away? When bagel says that
reliability is a practical difficulty, v.e would formulate the
practicality as the fact that the difficulty is remedied through
practices, namely the practice which, from the perspective of users
11. Selltiz et al., op. cit., page 148.
12. Cannel, Charles and Kahn, .Robert, "Interviewing", in Lindzey
and Aronson, op. cit., page 359*
lj. Weick, op. cit., page 428.
14* Nagel, Ernest, The Structure of Science, London: Routledge and
Kegan Faul, 19&1, page 489•
involves relying and from the perspective of observers involves
being reliable. Strictly speaking, then, it is not the difficulty
which is practical (and so can be expected to go away). What is
practical, i.e. something to be done, is the solution represented
in the idea of relying but the difficulty is not practical; the
difficulty is what makes the practice necessary. Furthermore, the
difficulty is not adequately formulated as some thing; standing in the
way of reliable knowledge since the basic difficulty (the fact that
non-observers, bein,; absent, cannot know) has been solved, albeit
practically, with the acknowledgement implicit in Nagel that relying
can be a method of knowing. By not focusing on his own implicit
acknowledgement, Nagel obscures the fact that the difficulty has been
solved, not by the practices, but by the decision to iet relying be a
way of knowing, i.e. by the decision which makes the practices
necessary.
15
.-hat is lacking in most discussions of the issue of reliability
is an understanding of why reliability becomes an issue whenever
observation and recording are used as means of obtaining; knowledge.
7,hat is there about the activity of recording such that it leads to a
concern with observer reliability? The concern with reliability
arises because of the fundamental fact that opinionated non-observers
are relying on knowledgeable observers to convert themselves into
15. See, for example, Galtung, Johan, Theoiy and Methods of Social
Research, London: George Allen and Unwin, 19&7: esp. page 121.
Siegel, Paul and Hodge, Robert, "A Causal Approach to the Study
of Measurement Error", in Blalock, Hubert and Ann, eos-.,
Methodology in Social Research. New York: McGraw Hill, 1971*
Cronback, Lee J., Essentials of Psycholordeal Testing,
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949-
knowledgeable users. When Cannel and Kahn write of reliability as
the "equivalence of a measure", we would reformulate it as the
equivalence of observer and user. This is to say that the measure,
as reliability, is the degree of analytic identity between recorder
and bureaucrat, an identity which universalizes the event without
at the same time contaminating it by opinionated bureaucratic
participation. The bureaucrat does not have to fuss with the
record itself as long as he controls the observer and thereby has
contact with the observation. Only because non-observers are in the
position of relying on observers does observers' reliability become a
possible question. Given the fact that observers are being relied
on, obviously it will become relevant to decide whether they are,
in f act, "rely-able". The concern with reliability is, then, nothing
but a user's way of expressing the essential suspicion of participation
in the event.
Our account of reliability must be carefully distinguished from
others' accounts. We are not saying that a concern with reliability
arises because "humans are fallible","^ "social scientists differ in
17
their value orientations", or "our sense organs operate in a
18
highly variable, erratic, and selective manner". Even if we were
inclined to accept all these assertions, they would not tell us why
reliability becomes an issue in the first place. That humans are
fallible does not explain why human failures matter to record users.
That social scientists differ does not explain why such differences
16. eick, op. cit., page 428
17. Nagel, op. cit., page 489 •
18. Madge, op. cit., page 120.
constitute a problem. Finally, the supposed properties of our sense
organs do not explain why we should be concerned about such properties.
To explain why reliability becomes an issue is not to cite the
"defects" which make for unreliability since these defects are
formulated as defects only because there has been a decision to make
reliability matter. Therefore, the complete explanation must explain
not why some of us or all of us are unreliable but why the question of
our reliability even arises. We are saying that a concern with
reliability is produced by the self-same commitment to the activity
of observing; which reliability resolves. The concern with reliability
is a practical expression of the basic fact that the absent non-
observer's structural position is always and irremediably one of
dependence in a world where the truth resides in the local nature of
immediate events.
In our terms, most ot er attempts to explain why troubles arise
over reliability are tod superficial. Roth's description of
information flow in a hospital can serve as an example:
The (medical) staff often has difficulty
obtaining reliable information about the
patient, partly because some kinds of
information by their very nature resist
definition and measurement, and partly because
of the manipulation of information by patients
and various staff groups.^9
It is undoubtedly true that patients and staff groups manipulate
information and that some information is resistant to measurement.
However, these facts alone cannot explain why the staff has difficulty
obtaining reliable information since to merely cite these facts is
19. Roth, Julius, "Information and Control in Tuberculosis hospitals",
in Freidson, Elliot, ed., The Hospital in hodern Society, Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1963» PaSe 294*
to presuppose without explicating why they might "be relevant. A
full explanation of the staff difficulties would require that Roth
note that reliability becomes a difficulty only because the staff must
simultaneously generate and overcome the difference between themselves,
on the one hand, and patients and staff, on the other hand, as users
and observers. They generate the differences by committing them¬
selves to observation without being present. They overcome the
differences by relying. The staff must rely on patients and staff
groups for its information, i.e. work to achieve analytic identity
with them, because of the very nature of the activity of observing.
Roth's account gives the impression that the difficulties over
reliability come from contingent features of this particular
organization. However, these particular features are noteworthy
to organization members and to Roth only because of the matter which
he leaves unexplicated: the essential character of the activities of
observing and using.
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The concept of reliability offers a solution to the administrator's
dilemma of having to evaluate records when there is no method of
determining their truth. Instead of evaluating records, administrators
can concentrate their efforts on attempting to ensure the reliability
of record-keepers. Administrators can use the following logics
although the truth of records cannot be directly determined, records
are true to the extent that record-keepers are reliable. Therefore,
by attempting to make record-keepers reliable, they are indirectly
attempting to make records truthful. They can assert their super¬
visory prerogative, not by watching over records but by watching over
observers. In the rest of this chapter, we shall present evidence to
suggest that although administrators and clerks do not directly
assess the truth of records (since that is impossible), they devote
considerable administrative energy to ensuring the reliability of
record-keepers.
Several ways in which the administration tries to supervise
record-keeping by fostering the reliability of record-keepers will
be discussed: (l) Restricting the "privilege" of record-writing to
professionals and semi-professionals. (2) Imposing legal and other
kinds of sanctions on record-vriters. (j) Instituting review
procedures, and (4) making bureaucratic tasks concurrent with medical
tasks.
(1) Professional reliability. lost students of the professions
stress that doctors acquire freedom from control in return for high
commitment to the norm of responsibility:
... the very great prestige of the professions
is a response of the society to their apparent
self denial, i.e. they can, Lpt typically do
not, exploit.^0
Goss writes:
... Physicians place high value on assuming
personal responsibility and exercising
individual authority in making professional
decisions. Accordingly, their role
expectations emphasize independence in the
realm of professional work.21
Whatever oter purposes it serves, the fact that only professionals
and "semi-professionals" (nurses, social workers, etc.) may write in
the record can be seen as an administrative tactic to encourage
20. Coode, William J., "Community within a Community: The Professions",
American Sociological Review, 1957> 22, page 196.
21. Goss, Pary, "Patterns of Bureaucracy among hospital Staff
Physicians", in Preidson, op. cit., page 1?6.
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dependable record-keeping. Only those who could be expected to
be reliable, because of their professional commitments, are permitted
to make entries in the medical record.
Some semi-professionals are very proud of the fact that they
may write in the record. V.hen asked to differentiate herself from
recreation workers, an occupational therapist noted that recreation
workers had no access to the medical record. Writers proud of the
privilege of writing records should be less likely to abuse the
privilege. We are not, of course, insisting on the empirical point
that professionals and semi-professionals will produce more reliable
records than untrained clerks. We are saying that the idea of
restricting the record to doctors and other "trustworthy" types,
whether it works or not, shows bureaucratic recognition that record
users must trust record writers in order to achieve analytic identity
with them. Here is a very concrete demonstration of Goode's point
about professional self denial. It is not just that professionals
work for low wages but that in an actual situation when self denial,
i.e. control over desire so that the event may be permitted to speak,
is called for, pr fessionals are being asked to do the job.
(2) Sanctions. The administration also uses more direct methods
than restricting record-writing to dependable groups in order to
foster reliability. Most entries in the medical record must be signed,
thus making the record-writer responsible for his record.
22. host discussions of professionals in bureaucracy emphasize
the conflict between bureaucratic and professional ideals.
It is being suggested here that dependability is a quality
which both bureaucracies and professions require. For
other areas in which professional ideals do not conflict with
bureaucratic ideals, see Goss, op. cit. and Goode, op. cit.,
pages 197-198.
Requiring a signature would seem to involve an implicit recognition
on the part of the administrator that records are only contingently
knowledge. If the observer's speech fails to mirror the event,
then the record is not knowledge but opinion. As opinion it will
belong to someone and it becomes relevant to know to whom it belongs.
Hence the need for the signature. Note that with a signature the
bureaucrat has a new option at his disposal. If he decides to rely
on the observer, he can know about the event. If he does not rely
on the observer, then he can at least know whom he finds unreliable.
In a sense, he has a record either way - either a record of the event
or a record of who made the opinionated speech. Thus there are at least
two senses in which Erikson and Gilbertson's point that a record is "a
record of the personnel who contributed to it" may be takens (l)
Obviously, personnel may figure in the events reported in adequate
records but also (2) by requiring signatures, administrators have the
option of treating any record, not as a report about an event, but as a
record of who failed to let an event speak. If administrators choose
this option then, although they cannot know the event, they can know
who they blame for their lack of knowledge, they can know who it is that
is unreliable. Given the possibility of this option, we can say that
signing a record might serve to encourage observers to be reliable by
reminding opinionated record-writers who are tempted to contaminate the
record that they may not succeed in getting others to adcept their
version of the event. Since they a re known (by signing), if it is
decided that they are unreliable, then what may become "known" is not
23
their version of the event but the fact that they are unreliable.
23. Fore than encouraging reliability, the signature seems to amount
to a claim by the record-writer that he is reliable. Here the
important point to notice is that, implicit in such a claim is a
recognition that observer reliability matters. owever, another
issue is why the administration wants the observer to make a claim.
We shall consider the signature again, from the viewpoint of its
status as a claim, in the nesct chapter.
Obviously, the writer becomes legally responsible for what he
24
has written by signing his name. However, the signer is also
*
accountable in more subtle ways. His colleagues will often look
at an entry which he has signed and then ask him: "Why did you write
that?" Similarly, at staff meetings which use medical records,
authors of an entry will often be asked to explain what they have
written. The fact that record-writers will sometimes refuse to
sign documents or think twice before signing offers some evidence
of signatures acting as sanctions controlling record-writers' behaviour.
Another aspect of the responsibility of doctors for their entries
in the record is the fact that some important entries must be
"authenticated" by superiors. An official I'ont Royal Hospital
memorandum states that "all histories, physical exams, and summaries
entered in the ecord by interns and first and second year residents
must be authenticated." Although, in practice, the "authentication"
procedure consists of a careless signature by a busy nan, the fact
that the initial writer knows that others may be held responsible
for what he writes fosters reliability.^
24. The staff are very much av.are of the legal responsibility that
goes with signing (or not signing) a record. They often advise
each other about whether or not to sign certain entries. For
example, an emergency room nurse said to an intern concerning a
patient who could not be admitted for administrative reasons:
"You ought to put your name on the chart just to protect yourself,
you saw him."
25. A resident in the emergency room, for example, was asked to
countersign an intern's write up. After readin£ what the
intern had written, he said, "I won't sign that." Instead,
he and the intern discussed the case more.
26. Thus, instead of letting residents "authenticate" their
records, interns will often ask the resident for advice
before even writing their note.
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Clearly a signature will not rule out unreliability. Indeed, the
fact that records must be signed makes some record-writers even less
inclined to be accurate if, for example, the truth would incriminate
them. However, whether or not the tactic works, the point of
requiring a signature is to attempt to supervise records by supervising
record-keepers.
(3) Replications. Administrators use the same tactic to foster
reliability that social scientists use. They attempt to have two or
more observers, working independently, write up the same events. A
patient's history is supposed to be taken by three doctors. Two
doctors are supposed to give him physicals. Daily "progress" reports
are supposed to be written by both attending and resident physicians.
It is true of course that doctors have ways of skirting rules
about replications. It is never certain that two entries about the
same event, when they appear in the record, constitute an authentic
replication. Since doctors writing later entries have access to
earlier entries, often the second note will merely reproduce the
27
first. However, just the fact that replications are required
shows that the administration is attempting to exercise control over
record-writera.
In the activity of replication, having two or more observers is
not, of course, a device for increasing individuality, variety, or
opinionated speech but for decreasing these extraneous influences.
In the peculiar logic of non-participation and self-denial which charac¬
terizes observers and record-users, it is hoped that the many will do,
so to speak, less than the one. Adding amounts to subtracting since
it is intended that the many will have less effect on the event than
the one would. How does this logic work? Any actual observer
27* As evidence of this point, often careless errors get repeated
over and over in supposedly independent entries.
could be opinionated and hence unreliable. If he is opinionated,
there is the danger that the speech which belongs to him could be
mistaken for the speech which belongs to the event. The idea of
replication serves to manage this danger by increasing the number
of observers and being interested only in what they have in common.
Since the more people, the less they will have in common it is hoped
that with enough people what they will continue to have in common
is what would be there if they had nothing in common, the impact of
that which affects them in spite of rather than because of themselves,
i.e. the pristine event which is supposed to speak through them rather
than because of them.
Although Galtung writes that we replicate to eliminate "... obser¬
vations that belong to one particular person ... and cannot be shared
28
by others", more rigorously it is not what observers share that
replication is after. Increasing the number of observers is intended
to bring observers to the point where they will share nothing and hence
the event will be available as what they still have in common in spite
of their complete differentness. What they will h; ve iriTcommon under
these circumstances is not really shared by them since it is not their
joint possession. Rather, since ideally they share nothing, if their
speech continues to show something common to them, it must not be
their speech (opinion) which is being expressed; it must be the
world's speech.
(4) Linking bureaucratic and professional tasks. A key
administrative strategy for producing dependable observers is to make
the record writer's medical and bureaucratic tasks coincide so that
28. Galtung, op. cit., page 28.
the same record is meant to serve both bureaucratic and professional
users. An example will clarify this point. A pathologist does
not perform two separate activities in reporting his findings to the
attending physician and producing a record for the files. Using
carbon paper he engages in both activities at once. A pathologist
who wanted to hide the fact that a patient's tumor was benign from
the medical record will also have to hide this fact from the surgeon
waiting to cut. Similarly, if the pathologist wanted to present
his colleagues with only an elliptical version of the event, he would
hove to present that to bureaucratic users too.
Having two or more records produced at once is a nice device
for minimising observer participation. If the two records were
produced by two separate acts, the observer would, of course, have
twice as many chances to intervene by imposing his own desire on the
event. In addition, the fact that the same record is used by both
doctors and bureaucrats has some additional significance which makes
it compatible with what has just been said about replication.
Instead of the number of observers, now the size of the audience is
being increased. Those concerned with reliability may be hoping that
with more than one audience (bureaucrats as well as doctors) the
observer will not have available the interactionally useful device
of tailoring the message to the audience. Lore than one~audience
is going to hear the same message. If the audiences have nothing
in common (nothing they all vant to hear) the observer may hove
nothing he wants to tell them all. If he has nothing he wants to
say, perhaps he will allow the event to speak more clearly through
29
The point here i9 different from Scott's suggestion that the
professional's conditional loyalty to the bureaucracy in which he
is working is among the basic sources of professional-bureaucratic
conflict. We agree with Scott, of course, that the professional,
in this case the doctor, may have only conditional loyalty to the
bureaucracy. There still remains the question, though, of specifying
the conditions under which that conditional loyalty will result in
loyal actions. What we are suggesting is that the bureaucrat can seek
to reduce the likelihood of the professional not conforming to its
rules (in this case not being a dependable record-writer) by making
its tasks concurrent with professional tasks.
In discussing four administrative tactics for fostering dependability,
our point has not been to argue that these tactics will or will not work.
Our interest has been in demonstrating the existence of these tactics.
The very existence of these tactics indicates how the administration
can supervise record-keeping without directly assessing the truth
of records. Namely, it supervises the production of records
indirectly by attempting to make record-writers reliable.
29. Ocott, Richard, ".professionals
Conflict", in Vollmer, Richard
Professionalization. Unglewood
Hall, 1966, pages 265-275•
in Bureaucracies - Areas of
and Mills, Donald, eds.,
Cliffs, New Jerseyj Prentice-
CHAPi'EH V
COMPLETENESS
In the last chapter, we treated administrative tactics fostering
reliability as a methodic response to the bureaucrat's dilemma that,
Although the truth of records cannot be directly determined because
the bureaucrat is not present at the event, the bureaucrat as user
must nevertheless satisfy himself that speech does not participate in
his use of the record. Another methodic solution to the same dilemma
is to reorganize the idea of presence to the local event by extending
v/hat is meant by the event to include the record. Administrators can
gain presence and hence make possible their non-participation by
reconceiving of the record as itself the event. If the record
itself can be conceived of as the event, then the administrator, who
obviously can be present with the record, is no longer necessarily in
a state of ignorance. The problem generated by the administrator's
absence at the original event can be overcome, then, not just by
surrogate presence as was the case with reliability, but also by making
the record itself into a thing which, like the observer's original
events, shows itself as what it is and so can be assessed, read, and
used, without reference to the original event. If the event can, as
it were, be extended to the administrator, then the administrator, like
the observer, need not express his opinions or otherwise intrude and
the event (now the record) can be protected.
It remains true, of course, that whether a record mirrors an
event cannot be determined by those who are absent when the event
occurs. However, records can be assessed in terms of standards other
than their effectiveness in mirroring events. For example, records
can be evaluated according to whether they possess various bureau-
cratically necessary forms and whether the forms have been "completed",
i.e. whether all questions on the form have been answered and whether
all the forms have been signed. Such evaluation amounts to
redefining the record as a visible event at which the bureaucrat,
being present, can sustain a selfless and neutral stance that does
not corrupt the pristine certainty of the event (now the record).
Thus bureaucratic standards are themselves a method for controlling
the (one who makes the) construction of the record so that the self¬
same principle of non-participation which record-writers were asked
to follow can also be followed by record-users. One may indeed
marvel that the idea by which a record is made synonymous with the
event it originally recorded - the idea that the event shall show
itself as what it is - is now turned around and made into the criterion
of adequate records. An ade uate record becomes not one which actually
mirrors the event (since knowledge of the accuracy of the record is
not available to those who are absent) but one which shows itself
to be adequate by appearing to be adequate to any bureaucrat who
looks at it.
Thus, while it may be that standards like bureaueratically
defined completeness seem ad hoc in that they are far removed from
the obvious original purpose of making a record, they remain in accord
with the grounds of the activity of recording. This is to say that
for bureaucracy, so-called ad hoc standards can sustain an interest
in the truth of records whereas at first blush it would seem that the
bureaucrat's absence at the appearance of the original event precludes
any such assessment. It is the conspicuous task of the bureaucrat
to re-achieve the original aim of the activity of recording, which
is to obtain knowledge rather than to create opinion, by letting
events speak, even in the face of his absence at the original event.
It is the bureaucrat's task to remember that adequate knowledge is
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obtainable only by refusing to speak so as to let events speak to him.
He fulfils his task by treating records as things which show themselves
to be what they are, thereby rendering further speech unnecessary.
The familiar general notion that bureaucratic organization leads to
the displacement of sentiments from goals (in this case obtaining
truthful records) to means (in this case evaluating records)'*' does
not really capture this phenomenon, since the displacement (if such
it be) remains in accord with the original grounds of the activity
of observation.
The hospital administration's overriding interest is in the
completeness of records. Vie shall show how the concern with com¬
pleteness and even the way in which completeness is defined, while
seemingly contradicting the goals of record-keeping, in fact manage to
re-achieve, within the bureaucratic context, the same basic record
keeper's principles which we have been analysing throughout. A
major theme of the discussion, then, is that evaluation of records in
terms of completeness is compatible with the basic principle that
records are supposed to report the truth, the truth being defined as
an observer defines it, namely as that which presents itself by
itself without any need for co-participation with it by speakers.
Just as those who are present at the event become observers by letting
the event present itself to them, those who wish to evaliiate become
readers (and readers for whom reading amounts, analytically, to
observation), by letting the record's completeness present itself
to them. The reader is able to achieve exactly the same kind of
passivity which the observer was able to achieve by treating the record
1. See Merton, op. cit., pages 199-200.
the way the observer treated the event - as a thing which is showing
him what it is.
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It is easily noticeable that completeness is the major standard
in terms of which records are actually assessed by bureaucrats.
Inaccuracy is never directly mentioned in the administration's
memoranda about records but incompleteness often is. One memorandum
deals exclusively with penalties for incomplete records. The
memorandum states that "failure to fulfil this requirement (completing
the record) will automatically authorize the director's office to
»»2
suspend admitting privileges ana/or to suspend operating privileges.
whenever a new kind of information is required for the medical
record, the memorandum which announces the new requirement includes
statements like:
The completion of ... (the new form) will be
a requisite for a completed chart. If
Medical Record, in reviewing charts of
discharged patients, finds that this form
has not been completed, it will indicate
that the chart is an incomplete one and the
appropriate disciplinary action will be ^
taken with reference to incomplete records.
Another memorandum notes that "an unsigned form renders the chart
r
incomplete and will not be accepted by the Medical Record Department."
A manual for hospital administrators also emphasizes, not that records
should be truthful, but that they should be complete:
In all cases the record should be complete to the
extent that it presents a comprehensive picture of
the patient's illness, together with the physical
findings and special reports, such as x-ray and
laboratory. Such a record substantiates the
diagnosis, warrants the treatment and justifies
the end result.5
2, From an official memorandum of Mont Royal hospital.
3. McGibony, John, Principles of Hospital Administration, New York,
G.P. Putnams Sons, 1952, page 468.
It is not just memoranda and manuals which indicate the
administration's overriding interest in the completeness of records.
It is also the administration's actions. Three clerks in the
Medical Record Room of Mont Royal Hospital constantly attempt to
force doctors to finish their records. Indeed, the major reason
for which doctors come to the record room is not to study old charts
but to finisn records. The record room receptionist assumes that a
doctor has come to complete records whenever he enters the record
room. Thus, she always greets doctors with: "You are doctor ..."
or, if she know them, "Hello, Dr. aitchcock". Then, without any
indication from the doctor as to the purpose of his visit, she will
send a file clerk to find the doctor's incomplete charts.
An entire wall of shelves is used to store incomplete charts.
The fact that there are regular procedures for processing incomplete
charts and even regular places to store them suggests, of course,
that, to the administration, incompleteness is both noticeable and
worth correcting. The obvious "uestion is why completeness rather
than accuracy is the major standard in terms of which the records are
assessed. Uur answer, already suggested, is that the question
proposes a distinction which bureaucrats, being absent at the original
event, need not respect. If we understand that bureaucrats remain
interested in truth but recognize their status as non-observers of
the original event, we can understand completeness as their way of
achieving presence, rs their way to deny participation, as their way
to the real. A clerk or an administrator, sitting in the record
room, can decide (using observers' principles) whether a record is
bureaucraticelly complete but not whether it is accurate'- Incompleteness
(a missing signature, a missing discharge summary) can be easily spotted
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even by medically naive clerks. These are things which can be seen
because they appear just like the observer's original events. The
clerks are doing the same basic activity that observers are doing.
They are letting what is present speak to them and so guide their
speech for them. Thus a concern with completeness does not contra¬
dict a concern with truth if by truth is meant commitment to
observational principles. The complete record is the observer-
bureaucrat's version of the true record in that, as far as he can
determine by looking, it shows itself to be true.
Indeed, if bureaucrats did concern themselves with the truth
of the record as a mirror of the original event, then they would be
contradicting observers' principles. They would be trying to gain
knowledge without being present. They would be participating. They
would be speaking their own minds rather than minding the event.
That a record correspond to an event is the business of those who
are there. This the bureaucrat believes, and, far from contradicting
this belief, he reasserts it by restricting himself to assessing
records as events, rather than the events the records purport to
record. Focusing on the completeness of the record transforms the
record into the bureaucrat's event and transforms the bureaucrat into an
observer who need not participate. We find in Chapter V as we found
in Chapter IV that whereas the bureaucrat and the record-writer may
do different things (the record-writer looks at events, the bureaucrat
looks at records), what they do is different only in the most super¬
ficial sense. The different things they are doing amount to the
same thing in the sense that they are different expressions (because
of differing structural locations) of the same commitment to treating
the real as that which will appear to those who would only look for it.
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V«e are not suggesting, of course, that the interests of administrators
and record-writers never clash. '. hat we are suggesting is that, at
least with regard to the phenomenon v,e are studying, the clash, when
it occurs, cannot be understood as a conflict between one goal and
another or between a commitment to goals and a commitment to means.
Rather, the clash amounts to the fact that the same goal, even the
same intention, will result in different behaviour because of
different structural locations within the same basic system. An
example may help concretize the discussion.
Although administrators take the task of finishing records very
seriously, doctors are not so committed to this principle. The
administration's attempts to get records completed amount to a
perennial concern: clerks are constantly trying to force record-writers
to finish and yet record-v.riters persist in not finishing. Doctors
take a light-hearted attitude toward the threats of record room clerks.
One doctor said, "They're sending me threatening letters; I'm gonna
report them to the FBJ." A doctor yelled to his colleague as the
latter was entering the record room: "Welcome to the hole of Calcutta."
A serious-minded doctor was just as uncommitted to the task of
finishing his records. He commented: "This is such an unrewarding
way to spend time."
Once they are in the record room, one of the major jobs for
doctors trying to finish their records is the dictation of discharge
summaries. Usually, doctors performing this task show distance
from what they are doing. Almost uniformly, doctors adopt a bored,
steady monotone while doing the dictation. One day, amidst general
laughter, a doctor unplugged his colleague's tape recorder while
the colleague was dictating. Doctors do not consider finishing
records to be a very important, demanding, or even necessary task.
Thus, when the emergency room receptionist asked a doctor to finish
his record by signing it, the doctor shoutedi "What the hell for?
I've got better thingB to do." Indeed, the very fact that charts,
unlike for example, operations, often remain unfinished indicates
the relative indifference of doctors to completing their records.
In order to understand these data, we must be quite clear about
the sense in which records tend to be unfinished. What is usually
seen to be missing by the bureaucrats is either a signature or a
discharge summary. Bureaucrats miss these but record-writers do
not because of the different ways the two different actors have of
doing the same activity. In other words, we shall show how the
doctors' indifference and the bureaucrats' concern are products of a
deeper agreement between them that knowledge can be obtained only by
denying one's own participation so as to let things show themselves.
Doctors' indifference to signing a record or writing a discharge
summary is an affirmation rather than a denial of the principles of
4
record-keeping. An adequate record is one in which the self of the
record-writer does not intrude on the event. Therefore, the doctor is
right to be indifferent to signing because, qua record-writer, he knows
that who wrote the record is not supposed to matter. The indifference
to signing, then, could represent his commitment to self denial.
Indifference to his own name expresses his belief that who he is does
not make a difference to the record. Similarly, a discharge summary
4. This is not to deny the point made in the last chapter that the
signature is used by the bureaucrat as a device to encourage
reliability. In the last chapter, we discussed the issue of why
a signature would be relevant to a bureaucrat, here the issue is
why a signature would be irrelevant to a record-writer. Below,
we discuss further aspects of the relevance of a signature to a
bureaucrat. We suggest that the signature serves to make the
record into an event.
should also be a matter of indifference since it is (supposed to) add
nothing- to what has already been said. It is (supposed to) repeat what
is already there to be seen anyway. from a record-writer's point of
view, a discharge summary does not finish a record at all since a
record is finished when the events it reports cease to appear and
hence cease to need mirroring. To an observer, a discharge summary
is an appendage to an already finished record. Delays in doing
discharge summaries are much more common than outright refusals to do
them. These delays are also understandable in terms of the record-
writer's principles. Unlike the original event, the record which is
supposed to mirror it is, at least ideally, permanent. Therefore the
discharge summary, which will be a record of the record, can be done
at any time. There is no rush since the event it will mirror (the
record) will not go away.
The bureaucrat will not accept the record-writer's logic here,
of course, but the important point for us to see is the basis of the
disagreement. It is obviously elliptical to say, as hospital
bureaucrats do, that record-writers do not finish records. Record-
writers do finish their own records but they do not finish the
bureaucrat's records. The bureaucrat's record will be finished, not
when the record completely mirrors the event, but when the record appears
to be complete according to bureaucratic standards. By not completing
this record, the record-writer is asserting his claim to have said
only what the event permits him to say. By demanding this record's
completion, the bureaucrat is expressing his desire to be able to
make the same claim. The disagreement is the product of a deeper
agreement, an agreement that speech can contaminate events and that the
solution is to let events or appearances do the speaking.
Especially relevant to the bureaucrat's completed record is the
presence of a doctor's or nurse's signature after every entry. Why
is the presence of the signature so important? By getting the writer
to sign the record the administration has gotten the writer to
declare or say (b,y signing) that the record is adequate. The
declaration is then treated by the bureaucrat as that which is showing
itself to him. He does not know whether the record mirrors the event
but he does know that someone says that the record mirrors the event.
That someone has said that the record is adequate becomes the fact
(event) which is presenting itself to the administrator. The
administration can therefore point to the declaration as its reason
for saying what it says about the record or, better, as its reason for
not having to say anything about the record. If a record is signed,
instead of having to decide (speak) about its adequacy, the bureaucrat
takes the fact that the record-writer says it is adecuate as deciding
things for him. The record appears to be adequate in that the writer
has declared it to be adequate. By claiming that his record is
adequate, the writer is making his record appear to be adequate and
is therefore making it possible for potential readers to treat his
record as a thing which is showing them what it is, as a thing which
they can observe, as a thing with which they can act precisely as the
original observer is supposed to act with the original event.
Unlike the original record-writer's speech, the correctness of
the signature need not be determined by matching it against some thing
external to itself. The signature's adequacy is not contingent on
whether it mirrors the world. Strictly speaking the signature i3
not a description of another event but itself the event. The
bureaucracy needs to be able to treat speech, not as opinionated and
therefore uncertain but as knowledgeable and definite. It does this
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by insisting on a kind of speech (the signature) which becomes adequate
not by being right but merely by being done. Merely by signing, the
signer is doing something. He is saying he is responsible. By saying
that he is responsible, he is removing the bureaucracy from responsibility
for its speech. The bureaucracy need not check his record against the
original (now,absent) event. The signer is making it possible for
the investigation (cf speech) to stop by making a speech which says,
claims, shows, and legally establishes where the responsibility lies.
When it is remembered that a signature is not a speech about some
other thing but itself an observable thing, it becomes u surprising to
note that whether the "correct" person signs a record is irrelevant to
record room clerks. It is easy to document that the clerks do not
care who signs the chart. In the record room, it is more important
that someone sign a chart, so that it can be considered complete, than
that the person who actually wrote the record sign it. A clerk faced
with the common problem of a doctor who had left the hospital permanently
without signing some of his charts approached a doctor who happened to
be in the record room, with the relevant chert and the following
statement: "He's not here anymore so you're gonna have to sign it;
sorry about that." Clerks often run up to doctors and ask them to
sign charts they have not even read, much less written. The record
room clerk's indifference to who signs the record does not conflict with
the basic idea of requiring a signature. He who signs takes responsi¬
bility by making himself appear to be the producer of the record. The
signature affirms responsibility by making the signer claim to be and
therefore (according to the viewpoint of reader-observers who are
supposed to be passive) be the author. Bureaucrats are indifferent
to who signs since the signer, merely by signing, will appear to be
the writer and so, from the perspective of those who need not decide
about speech since they treat speech (signatures) as things which exist
and. are adequate merely because they have been done, will be the writer.
Again, a Mertonian analysis would have failed to adequately
describe the phenomenon we are studying. We might have thought, if we
had followed herton's principles, that bureaucrats were failing to see
the intent behind the rule by accepting any signature rather than the
"correct" one and we might therefore have been content to describe our
bureaucrats as ritualists. liowever, it has turned out that the very
rule that a signature should be obtained, and not the fortuitous
ritualism of some of the rule followers makes possible and rational
the clerks' behaviour in accepting any signature. It is not that clerks
who accept any signature fail to see the intent behind the rule but
that the rule we are studying implicitly asks clerks to ignore the
question of intent. The hertonian approach fails to understand that
the idea behind some rules, in this case the rule requiring a signature,
is to overcome the constellation of problems implicit ii the concept
of "intent." To think about speech in terms of its intent is to make
speech indefinite all over again. It is to make any speech problematic
by asking us to ask the speech: " hat does it really mean?" The
point of the signature is to rid speech of this problem of intent or
meaning by getting someone to declare his intent, in this case his
intent to have spoken the truth. The declaration is supposed to solve
the problem of intent by making intent into something' th- t can be spoken
rather than that which any speech leaves unsaid.
To query the signature (as herton might expect a non-ritualistic
clerk to do) amounts to ouerying the speech and so acknowledging exactly
what the bureaucracy does not want to acknowledge, namely that the
signature is not an event but a speech and so raises a problem (its intent)
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by solving a problem (the intent of the record). By not querying the
signature, on the other hand, the clerk is being a good bureaucrat by
making speech into a thing which establishes itself (an event) rather
than a thing which requires participation. Even if the signature turns
out in the end to be a fraud, this is still no problem for the bureaucrat
since he can still excuse himself (deny the need for participation) by
pointing to the signature's existence. His argument can be: the
record may be a fraud but he was not to know since what was appearing
to him (his event) was that someone said (by signing) that the record
was true. At the very least, the clerks' behaviour is not a displace¬
ment from the original organizational goal since the original goal
implicit in requiring a signature (the goal of ridding speech of its
contingent status) is fulfilled rather than displaced by acouiring any
rather than a "correct" signature.
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In addition to the signature, other aspects of the record in which
the bureaucracy maintains an interest demonstrate how the bureaucracy,
by pursuing its goal of letting things speak to it so as to make
participation unnecessary, lias converted the record into a thing which
can show itself to be what it is.
A clerk in the record room was discussing a dilemma concerning a
patient's chart. The patient had died in the Emergency Room before
two essential parts of the record could be completed, the history of the
illness and the physical examination. The clerk suggested to the
doctor whose responsibility the chart was that he write: "Patient
came in in excellent condition. Deceased fifteen minutes later." We
can make sense out of her joke in terms of the principles we have
already discussed. From her point of view, what mattered was to have
a record rather than a "correct" record (in a correspondence sense
of correct). What mattered was to get something on paper. Again,
we have the record as contingent not on another event, but on itself.
The record is adequate when it has those things, e.g. a history of the
illness and a physical examination, which records are supposed to have.
When it has these things, it will appear to be a record and so can
be used by the bureaucracy. The clerk is conceiving of the record as
a thing. The clerk wants something on paper so that the record can
be observably a record. What she wants is compatible with (l)
bureaucratic commitment to the principles of observation and (2) her
absence at the original event.
Interesting forms to consider from the point of view of the
bureaucratic desire to treat the record as a thin are "consent" forms.
These must be signed by patients or near relatives before certain major
procedures like operations and transfusions can be performed. A
patient "consents" by signing a form which reads:
I, hereby give ray voluntary consent to
the performance of the following procedure, as
indicated, with whatever anesthesia is prescribed
upon . I certify that the above procedure
has been explained to me and I understand the
diagnostic or treatment necessary for it. font
rtoyal Hospital, its medical staff, and employees
are hereby released from the liability of the
results of this procedure.
There are extensive regulations designed to ensure that these forms are
signed and entered into the record before patients undergo surgery.
However, there are no written regulations requiring that "consent" forms
accurately describe what occurred between patient and doctor.
According to the principles of the acti/ity of observing,
consent forms are all wrong. Except for a few blank spaces, these
forms are written, not by present observers, but by absent administrators.
All of the forms are uniform so they cannot vary with the peculiarities
of individual events. As descriptions of events, clearly, consent
forms are inadequate.
However, the purpose of consent forms is not to represent events.
What is important is not whether a form accurately describes events.
Rather, what is important is the mere presence of a signed form in
the record. Although a signed form may not be an accurate
representation, it is complete in the sense that it says everything
that must be said in order to protect the hospital against malpractice
suits. That is, the consent form need not be "accurate" because
strictly sneaking it is not a description at all. It is not a report
of an event. It _is an event. Kerely by being there it shows all
concerned that consent has been obtained. It _is_ the consent. As
such it fulfils rather than negates observers' principles by being
understandable as an attempt to solve the problem of the administrator'
absence by bringing the consent to him and so making it possible for




Insights into various other topics besides records can be obtained
through a consideration of the results of this study. It is perhaps
fitting to conclude by mentioning ways of beginning to think about
other potential studies. First we shall briefly apply our results to
the issue of whether empirical analysis can be said to '"test" theories.
Using examples from Marcuse and Sacks, we shall suggest that the very
idea of being empirical predetermines what questions can be asked and
so precludes the testing of some theories. Next we shall try to
analyze the speech of two sociological theorists in much the same way
that we have analyzed the idea of a record, i.e. as phenomena which
require a method of production. It will be suggested that Erving
Goffman speaks by presenting some thing to an audience and that Harold
Garfinkel wants us to understand his speech by understanding its method
of production. Finally, we suggest that, in the body of this work,
our method of treating speech has been more like Garfinkel's than
Goffman•s.
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Iviost modern social scientists are uncomfortable with the notion
that even the most rigorous use of empirical methods permits one to
see "the" world. Instead, sociologists tend to say that the use of
empirical methods affects the world. The usual way to make this
point is to equate the effect of empirical methods with the effect of
the observer and therefore to imply that the empirical effect can be
reduced to the extent that the observer's "bias" can be reduced. While
we would not, of course, deny that concrete observers can have an
effect on things, we have been able to understand the idea of empirical
effects differently: the very idea of empirical analysis affects
"thin s" in that the idea of being empirical presupposes a particular
definition of thingness. Being empirical requires conceiving of "things"
as that which can appear or show itself. Given this formulation of
the effect of observation, we can say that observer effects are not
merely the result of what concrete observers do or do not do. Even if
freedom from bias were possible, it would still be true that observing
affects the world in the sense that the idea of observation enforces a
specific notion of "the world".
The extent to which theories can be "tested" by observation is
limited, since if a central tenet of the theory were that appearances
need not be true, observation would not "test" the theory. Perhaps
Marcuse's objections to "one-dimensional" social science could be rephrased
along these lines.Marx, as Karcuse reads him, makes a distinction
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between true and false needs. Mani's true needs are not necessarily
to be identified with what man says he needs. Nor should true needs
be equated with what the evidence of behaviour shows that man appears
to need. Therefore, "tests" of whether man needs what Marcuse (or
Marx as hareuse reads him) thinks he needs, could not be carried out
by observational methods. We could not refute arcuse by observing
man. Indeed, the very idea that a determination of man's needs could
be obtained by observation is anti-Marcusean because the idea pre¬
supposes that a man's needs are what they appear to be.
If our analysis of observation offers some support for Marcuse's
critique of social science, it also undercuts some of the conclusions
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of a very influential ethnomethodologist - Harvey Sacks. By deciding
1. Marcuse, Herbert, One Dimensional Man, London: Abacus, 1972,
esp. pages 78-103.
2. Ibid, page 19• See also Eros and Civilization, Boston: Beacon
Press, 1955*
3. Sacks' most important work has not been published yet. The
ideas we discuss are developed by Sacks in unpublished lectures.
to answer the question of how speech is possible through a study of
transcripts of tape recordings, Sacks has predetermined the sort of
answer he can offer to the question. Sacks believes that he has
"discovered" that speech is produced by "current speakers" doing one
of three things: (l) selecting next speakers, (2) selecting next
action but not next speaker, or (3) showing other potential speakers
that they are finished so that these others may "self select". is
is obvious from the nature of these three techniques, Sacks has con¬
verted the ouestion of the possibility of speech into the question of
the possibility of a next speech. Basically, Sacks takes the
possibility of speech as a given and investigates only the nuestion of
how further speeches are possible given the existence of a first
4
speech. Instead of considering the very possibility of speech as
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Blum and Rosen have done recently, Sacks can consider only the
organizational practices which lead to the continuance of speech.
Sacks' "findings" do not, of course, refute Blum's and Rosen's
accounts of speech. Sacks' method of analysis makes it impossible
for him to even ask their question. Their topic is inaccessible to
him because of his method.
How does Sacks' method preclude discussion of the issue Blum and
Rosen have raised? As they have argued, providing for the possibility
of speech requires postulating something which comes before speech and
which could generate it. It is therefore impossible to provide for
speech by beginning with speech. Yet Sacks' method forces him to
consider only what is presenting itself on the transcript. Hence he
4« I am indebted to fr.oira focKinlay for an extremely perceptive
remark in a tutorial which helped me to develop this formulation.
5« See Blum, Alan, Theorizing, London: Keinemann, 1974 and Rosen,
Stanley, Nihilism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969•
must start with speech. Sacks cannot consider the question of the
possibility of speech because he restricts what he can say to what he
can see (or hear). All he can see or hear is what is showing itself,
in this case speech. Since that which could generate a first speech,
that which could generate the possibility of speech, is not disclosing
itself in the transcript, (where only speeches are disclosing themselves),
Sacks has no way to talk about the possibility of speech. By
restricting himself to what shows itself (speech), he is not able to
discuss the issue of what makes the showings (speeches) possible.
By way of contrast, in our study we did try to consider the possibility
of at least one kind of speech. Instead of treating the observer's
speech (record) as a given, we tried to explicate how the observer
manages to produce his kind of speech. Whereas we moved from the
possibility of the observer's speech to an explication of how that
possibility is achieved, Sacks treats speech as already achieved and
investigates only the question of how further speeches are possible.
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In Chapter V we came to the conclusion that evaluating records
in terms of completeness amounts to treating the record as an event,
i.e. as a self-disclosing thing. However it is not only bureaucrats
who treat speech as a thing for the same basic formulation can prove
useful in developing analyses of sociological theorists. It became
possible to notice that non-observers treat speech as a self-revealing
thing only after a clear notion of an alternative approach to speech
had been articulated. It is this alternative which is providing the
method for an investigation of various sociological theorists. The
alternative is to treat the speech of sociologists in terms of its
method of production, i.e. not as a thing- which discloses itself but
as a thing which has been achieved through the unspoken procedures
which make it possible. The procedure involves conceiving of speech,
not as a secure thing, but as an accomplishment whose method of
production can be explicated. We shall exemplify the procedure by
applying it to two books, Goffman's The Presentation of Self in Everyday
£
Life, and Garfinkel's Studies in Bthnomethodology.
In The Presentation of Self. Goffman is obviously saying something
about how persons present themselves to others. Less obviously though,
in order to make his speech, Goffman is implicitly relying on a version
of what it is to speak. In a sense, Goffman's book is generated by
his version of speech and therefore we can seek to understand him by
understanding how it is possible for him to speak. Our very tentative
proposal is that Goffman speaks by using the self-same principle which
he talks about in his discussion of ordinary people: Goffman speaks
by presenting some thing to the reader. In other words, he speaks by
being an actor who brings things (speeches) to appearance and asks
readers to respond by being an audience who will passively accept the
appearance (speech) he creates. Goffman's topic, the presentation of
self, is also his method of speaking. Being able to speak, for
Goffman, amounts to being able to present things (speeches) which will
serve to impress and control others (readers) in desired ways.
We can further develop our analysis of Goffman's version of
speech by specifying how it makes sense of some otherwise puzzling
features of his book. As first year sociology students readily notice,
there are no hypotheses in Goffman. Two books as different from each
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other as Suicide and The Affluent .orker in the Class Structure both
6. Goffman, Erving, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New
York: Anchor Books, 1959*
7. Goldthorpe, John, Lockwood, David, Beckhofer, Prank, and Piatt,
Jenifer, The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1971 •
pass the most conventional test of scientific status by having
hypotheses which can be confirmed or disproved. According to this
test, Goffman's study is sadly lacking. The closest thing to a
hypothesis in the book is perhaps the first sentence:
Yihen an individual enters the presence of others,
they commonly seek to acnuire information about
him or to bring into play information about him
already possessed.®
However, Goffman does not so much test this statement as apply it.
Goffman's ideal reader is certainly not supposed to ouestion this
statement. He is supposed to accept it and then consider what follows
from what he has accepted. In general, the reader should not question
Goffman's speech, he should receive it, much as he would receive an
impression. The statement of what individuals "commonly do" amounts
to a presentation. It is a thing Goffman wants to impress on us, and
therefore, as Goffman would see it, it is not its truth or falsity which
matters. Unlike a hypothesis, the statement need not be question-able.
What matters to Goffman is whether he can make us do what he wants with
the speech, apply it to things so that we can see things as he sees them.
There are no hypotheses in Goffman since Goffman uses his speech to
create things (and present them to readers) rather than to question
things.
As a creative presentation, Goffman's speech comes to us out of
whole cloth. Like the observer's events, what Goffman says has an
essentially independent existence, it is self-contained. On the other
hand, the authors of The Affluent Worker manage to speak (write a book)
by establishing a relationship with their predecessors, i.e. the
"proponents" of the "embourgeoisiement" thesis. These authors'
8. Goffman, op. cit., page 1.
speech constitutes itself as a "test" of what has been said before.
Goffman has no such relationship with predecessors. Goffman's
speech is a beginning rather than a continuation. The beginning of
his speech (bock) like the beginning of a new event is the beginning of
an essentially new time period rather than a new moment in an old
tradition. The "ahistoricism" which Gouldner finds in Goffman, then,
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extends to his veiy method of speaking. Goffman speaks, not by
relating himself to what has come before, but by beginning anew. He
begins anew by presenting readers with his own beginning, the con¬
ceptual apparatus he wants us to use. We, as readers, are not supposed
to look for what has produced these concepts, i.e. for what came
before them. Instead of being part of a tradition, these concepts
create a tradition, a new history which begins with the concepts Goffman
gives us. Just as Goffman's actors give and give off v/hat they want
the audience to receive, Goffman speaks by giving. The reader's task,
such as it is, is not to question but merely to receive the gift that
is Goffman's speech.
The same analysis can clarify why, as many have noted, Goffman's
concepts are only metaphors. Basically, Goffman would not accept the
"only" since if a speech is supposed to do nothing but present a way to
see things which readers are supposed to accept but not question, then
a metaphor becomes an adequate speech. The distinction between
metaphor and description is a distinction between speech about how
9. Gouldner, Alvin, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, New
Yorki Avon Books, 1970» page 391* Gouldner believes that
his remark applies to both Goffman and Garfinkel. However,
as we suggest below, Garfinkel's speech is Certainly not
outside of time in the way Goffman's is.
things look and speech about the way things are. Such a distinction
is not accessible to Goffman since, for Goffman, the point of talk is
to tell us how to look at things.^
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A distinguishing feature of Goffman's speech is that it does not
lend itself easily to a reflexive treatment. To some extent, one
is violating the spirit of Goffman by thinking about how his speech
is produced. However there are other thinkers who use their speech
to ask us to read them reflexively. We shall suggest that Harold
Garfinkel is one sociologist who wants to be treated reflexively, and
further, that various problematic features of his work and its
reception begin to make sense if we realize that his speech is not
supposed to be accepted and used.
Garfinkel begins his book with a chapter called "What is Ethno¬
methodology? A careful reading of the chapter reveals that
Garfinkel never answers the oueation. He gives various examples of
studies which would qualify as ethnomethodology, but he never actually
tells us what ethnomethodology is. We might >,onder why Garfinkel
needs a whole chapter just to say what ethnomethodology is and
further, why, in the chapter, he seemingly fails to answer his own
question by never saying what ethnomethodology is. However, perhaps
we are bewildered only because we are falsely assuming that Garfinkel
is actually trying to say what ethnomethodology is. If he were to say
what ethnomethodology is, he would be producing a definitive speech,
a speech which told us what to think. But the whole idea of ethno-
10. Since our analysis of Goffman may appear to coincide v.ith Gouldner's
at this point, it might be helpful to differentiate hi3 from ours.
Gouldner certainly notic s that Goffman equates appearance and reality.
However, Gouldner does not go on to consider the implications of this
equation for Goffman's speech. See Gouldner, op.cit., pages 378-390.
11. Garfinkel, op. cit., pages l-34»
methodology is that no speech is definitive since every speech achieves
something without saying how the achievement is possible. Since
Garfinkel's notion of speech is that it is an accomplishment which
can only be understood reflexively, i.e. in terms of its possibility,
had he defined ethnomethodology he would have denied his main point.
According to Garfinkel, every speech is unfinished in that it
does not speak about its own possibility. Understanding a speech
involves not merely accepting it but grasping how it was possible to
say it. Had Garfinkel used his speech to produce a definition of
ethnomethodology, he would have failed to engage the reader in the
reflexive process that is understanding. Garfinkel would have failed
to show the reader that e thnomethodology cannot be understood merely
by the passive act of accepting the speeches, e.g. the definitions,
which ethnomethodblogists make. Gthnomethodology can be understood
only by reflecting on how Garfinkel can say what he says. Garfinkel can
spend a whole chapter and, in a sense, a whole book discussing? what
ethnomethodology is, since what ethnomethodology is cannot be said
definitively. Though what ethnomethodology is cannot be stated
definitively, it can be understood by thinking about how any saying
(including of course sayings about what ethnomethodology is) depends
on, yet does not formulate, its method of production. The reason for
the absence of a definition of ethnomethodology is that ethnomethodological
understanding is not just a matter of speaking, e.g. defining, and
accepting the speech. It is a matter of understanding the possibility
of speech.
Garfinkel's reader must be involved in the process of understanding.
He must supply the method which Garfinkel's speech leaves unsaid. Some
surprising consequences concerning the status of ethnomethodological
work follow from this point. For one thing, to repeat in shortened
form what Garfinkel says, i.e. to "summarize" him, is to produce
banality. V.e suspect that the lesson to be taken from the banality
of summaries of Garfinkel is not that Garfinkel is banal but that
Garfinkel's kind of speech does not lend itself to summary. To
summarize Garfinkel is to identify the point of Garfinkel with what
he says. To summarize is to treat Garfinkel as what he soys rather
than how he could have said it. Garfinkel's speech resists repetition,
even in the abbreviated form of summary, because the point of his speech
is that every speech (including his of course) raises a new ouestion,
namely how it could have been said, i.e. accomplished. To summarize
or otherwise repeat Garfinkel is to fail to see the point of his speech,
namely the question of method which is implicit in every speech.
Every speech calls for something that it has not itself articulated,
every speech calls for its method of production.
For much the same reason that summary fails, Garfinkel's disciples,
if they do not differentiate themselves from him, tend to produce banal
studies. They hear Garfinkel's speech as definitive speech, speech
which tells them what to say or do. By hearing him in this way, they
are failing to listen to the message of his speech. Th^r fail to see
that no speech resolves the problem of what to say or do. Rather,
speech jLs something we do. It is an accomplishment and therefore must
be thought of ethnomethodologically, i.e. in terms of its method of
production. Garfinkel thinks of his own speech as an active accomplish¬
ment which makes a difference to the world. As he often puts it, all
speech is a feature of the setting in which it is produced. That is,
accounts do not just report on things; accounts are things; accounts
are themselves constitutive of settings.
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What are the consequences of this view of speech for the speech
of disciples? If one tries to accept Garfinkel's speech, one is
failing to understand oneself as a speaker. By passively accepting
Garfinkel's speech, one is failing to speak (in Garfinkel's sense) by
failing to accomplish anything, by failing to make a difference with
one's own speech. By becoming a "loyal" disciple, one fails to have
anything to say, hence the banality of his disciples' work. If speech
is making a difference or accomplishing something, then true loyalty
to the spirit of Garfinkel's speech involves not saying (nor summarizing)
what he says. Loyalty would involve continuin to think about speech
in a Garfinklean way, i.e. as an accomplishment, perhaps by thinking
about how Garfinkel's (or anyone else's) speech was produced. Whereas
Goffman wants us to accept the difference his speech has made by
accepting his conceptual apparatus, Garfinkel wants us to think about
what speech is such that it could make a difference, by thinkin; about
his (or anyone's) speech.
It is a common-place among sociologists that Garfinkel is a writer
who is difficult to understand. Perhaps we can enliven this notion
by considering how it might be a suitable characterization of him.
In the light of our discussion we can say that it is only possible to
understand Garfinkel when one understands what Garfinkel means by
understanding. If we try to "understand" by treating Garfinkel's speech
as thing rather than accomplishment, if we try to accept and perhaps
repeat "what" he is saying, we are already lost since Garfinkel's
speech does not have the status of a thing, and so the point of his
speech is not "what" he says. The point of his speech is what he
does not say, namely the nethod, the "how" which his conclusions cover
over. e have missed the point of Garfinkel - we have failed to
understand, him in his own sense of understanding - if we think of
his speech as an uncuestionable thing rather than as an achievement
whose possibility is left unsaid by the speaker. When v,e find it
difficult to understand Garfinkel, actually we are experiencing
Garfinkel's point. Ye might say (in this context) that understanding
is difficult. Garfinkel tries to show us (among other things) the
source of the difficulty. Understanding is difficult because we do
not understand a speech when we merely accept it or reject it. Since
every speech is an accomplishment which leaves its method of
accomplishment unsaid, we can understand a speech only when we do
something, i.e. say what the speech leaves unsaid. Garfinkel makes
understanding into a truly demanding and involving activity by giving
the reader something active to do. The reader's job is not to accept
or reject what Garfinkel says. His job is to say what Garfinkel leaves
unsaid.
Needless to say other theorists besides Garfinkel and Goffman can
be analyzed in terms of how their speech is produced. However instead
of pursuing these studies now, we might note by way of conclusion that
what we have been doing to Goffman and Garfinkel is basically similar
to what we have been doing in the body of the work to most of the writers
we have quoted. We have tried not to let the quotations we have used
stand as definitive speeches, even if we "agreed" with them. Starting
from what someone said (the quotation) we tried to provide a method
which would permit them to say it. In Chapter I we discussed how
various authors could see records as a contingency. In Chapter II
we discussed (among other things) how it was possible for elltiz,
Cicourel, and others to link observation and note taking. In Chapter
III, we tried to provide grounds for the link between records and
events, and for the idea that observers can see one thing at a time.
In Chapter IV, we tried to provide for the accepted idea that observers
must be reliable and in Chapter V we tried to provide grounds for the
accepted idea that records can be evaluated. Throughout, we have
been trying to articulate that which other speakers have left unsaid.
Implicit in our whole study, then, is an alternative to the kind of
speech represented by records. The alternative requires not making
one's own speech into nothing (as record-writers do) but instead,
trying to accomplish something with speech, namely an understanding of
what others have not said.
Research Note
All the hospital data were gathered between September, 1969 an<i
August, 1971 when I was a project supervisor at a large public hospital
in New York City.^" As a social scientist actually working for the
hospital I was allowed ready access to all areas of the hospital which
I wished to study. Most of my research time was spent in the
hospital's Medical Record room. I identified myself as a researcher
interested in medical records and was allowed to examine the files as
often and as thoroughly as I liked. I noted down verbatim any parts
of the record which seemed to me to be of interest. I was also able
to observe the vaz*ious kinds of interaction that occurred in the record
room since my desk was conveniently located in the same room where all
the clerks worked and where doctors came to complete their records.
The other major piece of research I carried out was the observation
of the actual process of record-writing in two areas of the hospital:
the emergency room and a rehabilitation centre. In both cases, I told
persons in charge that I was interested in the record-keeping process
and was invited to stand (or sit) at the main desk and observe the on¬
going business of the hospital (including the writing of records). In
the rehabilitation centre, where the jjace was slower, I also participated
in a good deal of the routine daily work, attending meetings, accompanying
nurses on visits to patients' rooms, etc.
Rrom time to time I conducted both formal and informal interviews
with doctors, nurses, and administrators in order to elicit their
opinions about issues and problems involved in record-keeping. In
addition, the administration allowed me to study an extensive collection
of memoranda concerning records and related topics.
1. "Mont Royal" is a cover name for the hospital.
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